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A B S T R A C T
Conditional credence is an important concept in many areas of philos-
ophy. However, little consensus has been achieved regarding to its se-
mantics and ontology. In this thesis I shall sketch a contextualist sup-
positional account of conditional credence by drawing insights from
two seemingly disjoint debates: the foundational debate on the re-
lationship between conditional and unconditional probabilities, and
the semantic debate on the relationship between conditional probabil-
ity and probabilities of conditionals. I argue that, for a given pair of
propositions A and B, the conditional credence one ought to have for
B given that A - P(B|A) - may depend on contextual parameters like
the way in which we mentally represent the extensions of as well as
the stochastic relationships between A and B.
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According to the subjective theory of probability, probabilities are
degrees of partial credence. For a subject S, the probability that a
coin lands on head is 1/2 just in case her degree of certainty that the
coin will land on head is half as much as her degree of certainty that
the coin will land on heads or tails.1 On this account, conditional
probabilities measure conditional credence, which plays a vital role
in analyses of inferential dispositions, suppositional reasoning and
belief revisions. However, while the notion of conditional credence
is widely used in many areas of philosophy, very little consensus has
been achieved with respect to its meaning and ontology. What is
conditional credence? How is conditional credence related to uncon-
ditional credence, if the distinction withholds? Are they two intrinsi-
cally different epistemic states, or is one supervenient on or reducible
to the other? And what are the connections between conditional cre-
dence and unconditional credence in conditionals, apart from their
orthographic similarity?
In this thesis, I shall sketch a preliminary account of conditional cre-
dence by looking into two ongoing debates concerning conditional
probability: the foundational debate on whether conditional proba-
bilities are reducible to unconditional probabilities, and the semantic
debate on whether conditional probabilities are equivalent to prob-
abilities of conditionals. Traditionally, these two debates have been
treated as orthogonal to each other, partly because they effectively
start off from two opposite sides of the same sequence of equalities:
P(AB)
P(A)
= P(A given that B) = P(if A then B).
For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to the first equality
P(A given that B) =
P(AB)
P(A)
as THE RATIO and the second equality
P(A given that B) = P(if A then B)
1 I am being deliberately vague here by using the word “certainty”, which could mean
at least two epistemic attitudes: belief or acceptance. While the distinction between
belief and acceptance is controversial and, to my knowledge, does not feature very
much in the literature of Bayesian epistemology, those who do respect the difference
generally regard acceptance as requiring more evidential support but involving less
absolute certainty than belief. For example, a scientist may accept the quantum
field theory without actually believing that there are no particles, only fields. On
the other hand a student may believe that her answer to an exam question is right,
but would only accept that this is in fact the case she double-checks with the book
afterwards. For more discussion on this distinction, see [Schwitzgebel, 2015]. For
the rest of my thesis I shall join the mainstream and use belief and acceptance (and
correspondingly, believability and acceptability) interchangeably.
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as THE THESIS. Those who care about the relative analytical primi-
tiveness of conditional and unconditional probabilities often assume
that there is an intimate connection between conditional probability
and probabilities of conditionals. On the other hand, those who are
invested in explicating the semantics of indicative conditionals would
suppose that the concept of conditional probability is well-defined,
usually in terms of the ratio formula P(B|A) = P(AB)/P(A). As a
result, the point of contention for one debate is taken for granted by
the other, and what each side ends up showing is therefore the com-
patibility of THE RATIO and THE THESIS, rather than the tenability
of each equality all by itself.
I contend that, if we constrain ourselves to the subjectivist frame-
work, then we can break out this loop and address both questions si-
multaneously by a contextualist suppositional account of conditional
credence. Specifically, according to this account, conditional probabil-
ities are not reducible to unconditional probabilities, but conditional
probabilities are analytically equivalent to unconditional probabilities
of conditionals.
The thesis is structured as follows: in §1 I present an “omission”
argument against the ratio analysis of conditional probabilities given
in [Ha´jek, 2003]. Ha´jek argues that THE RATIO leaves conditional
probabilities undefined in cases where we seem to have well-defined
intuitions about what they should be. This suggests that the notion of
conditional probability is primitive and irreducible to unconditional
probabilities. One way to counter Ha´jek’s allegation is by extending
the range of probability functions to include infinitesimal numbers.
However, I argue that this solution would not completely stave off
Ha´jek’s objection in light of the argument of [Williamson, 2007]. In-
stead, I think the “omission” argument is predicated on ungrounded
assumptions about conditional probabilities. In §2 I give a rundown
of seven claims which Ha´jek takes to be the “basic facts about con-
ditional probabilities.” I argue that none of Ha´jek’s seven claims
hold universally across all possible propositions and probability dis-
tributions. So the ratio analysis is correct to “omit” such cases be-
cause there is insufficient contextual information given to pin down
a unique value for the given conditional probability. Moreover, from
this analytical perspective, the fact that the ratio analysis is guilty of
“the sin of omission” counts in favor of rather than against Ha´jek’s gen-
eral thesis, namely that conditional probabilities are not reducible to
or supervenient on unconditional probabilities.
Having foreshadowed the context-dependency of conditional prob-
abilities in continuous settings, I shall generalize this observation to
discrete cases by giving a semantic account of conditional probabil-
ity within the subjectivist framework. In §4 I consider and dismiss
the counterfactual account of conditional credence as proposed by
[Lowe, 1996]. In §5 I propose a modified suppositional account of con-
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ditional probabilities that would stave off the objections to the coun-
terfactual account and a more general worry raised in [Chalmers and Ha´jek, 2007].
Since the suppositional account gives the same semantics for “B given
that A” and “if A then B,” it predicts that THE THESIS is trivially true.
So any objection to THE THESIS is therefore a challenge to the suppo-
sitional account and in §6 I defend my contextualized suppositional
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The current orthodoxy in probability theory is Kolmogorov’s ax-
iomatization. According to Kolmogorov, the conditional probability
of B given that A is given by
P(B|A) =def P(AB)P(A) (provided that P(A) 6= 0)
Ha´jek argues that this definition of conditional probability is inade-
quate. The argument proceeds as follows:
1. THE RATIO leaves the value of P(B|A) undefined whenever
P(A) = 0.
2. There are meaningful propositions with zero probabilities.
3. P(B|A) can be well-defined even if P(A) = 0.
4. So THE RATIO is inadequate.
Since 1 follows directly from THE RATIO, Ha´jek proceeds to validate
premise 2 and 3. He first proves the necessary existence of “trouble
spots” in an uncountable probability space:
(Four Horn Theorem) For any uncountable probability space, there
are uncountably many “trouble spots” in the space for which the
probability assignment must be zero, infinitesimal, vague or unde-
fined.
Since the probability functions are presumed to be sharp and real-
valued, it follows that for any uncountable probability space, there
are uncountably many nonempty propositions that have probability
zero.
Ha´jek then posits seven “basic facts” about conditional probabil-
ities that he thinks are necessarily true for any proposition A and
probability function P irrespective of the value of P(A).2 They are
I. P(A, given that A) = 1
II. P(¬A, given that A) = 0
III. P(T, given that A) = 1, where T is a necessary truth (e.g. it is
raining or it is not raining)
IV. P(F, given that A) = 0, where F is a contradiction (e.g. it is
raining and it is not raining)
V. P(a fair coin lands on head, given that A) = 1/2
2 For purposes relevant to the particular goal of this thesis, I shall constrain myself to
talking about probabilities of propositions. On this interpretation, the probability of
a set S is the probability of the proposition that “a randomly selected point from the
domain is an element of S,” and the probability of an event is the probability of its
corresponding linguistic descriptions.
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VI. Let x be a point selected from the interval [0, 1] with uniform
probability distribution. Then
P(x = 1/4, given that x = 1/4 or x = 3/4) = 1/2
VII. Let x be a point randomly selected on the Earth’s surface. Let
W denote the Western hemisphere, and E the Equator. THen
P(x ∈W, given that x ∈ E) = 1/2.
In all seven cases, THE RATIO predicts that the conditional prob-
ability is undefined when P(A) = 0 (or equivalently when A is a
“trouble spot”), whereas our intuitions suggest that the conditional
probability is in fact well-defined. So Ha´jek concludes that THE RA-
TIO is guilty of “sins of omissions”- by reducing conditional probabil-
ities to ratios of unconditional probabilities, it fails to capture certain
sharp conditional probabilities that should be well-represented in the
formal system.
However, there seems to be a quick way out: recall that Ha´jek’s
Four Horn Theorem says that for any uncountable probability space,
there are uncountably many trouble spots for which the probability
assignments are either zero, infinitesimal, vague or undefined. So
what Ha´jek has really shown is that if we restrict ourselves to real-
valued probability functions, then conditional probabilities cannot
be defined or analyzed in terms of unconditional probabilities using
THE RATIO. But there is no a priori prescription that says (subjec-
tive) probability functions must be real-valued. So the defender of
THE RATIO may respond to Ha´jek’s objection by simply enlarging
the range of probability functions from R to a hyperreal field H such
that every purported “trouble spot” receives an infinitesimal but non-
zero probability. In this way, THE RATIO can be redeemed as follows:
If A is a trouble spot in our probability space, let P(A) = e where
0 < e < 1n for all n ∈ Z≥1. Then
I. P(A, given that A) = P(A)/P(A) = e/e = 1
II. P(¬A, given that A) = 0/e = 0
III. P(T, given that A) = e/e = 1, where T is a necessary truth
IV. P(F, given that A) = 0/e = 0, where F is a contradiction
V. P(a fair coin lands on head, given that A) = (1/2)/e = 1/2
VI. Let x be a point selected from the interval [0, 1] with uniform
probability distribution. Then
P(x = 1/4, given that x = 1/4 or x = 3/4) = e/2e = 1/2
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VII. Let x be a point randomly selected on the Earth’s surface. Let
W denote the Western hemisphere, and E the Equator. THen
P(x ∈W, given that x ∈ E) = (e/2)/e = 1/2.
So introducing infinitesimal numbers seems sufficient for saving
THE RATIO from Ha´jek’s objection.

1
C R I T I Q U E O F I N F I N I T E S I M A L A N A LY S I S
1.1 the eternal coin
One of the strongest objection to the use of infinitesimal numbers
is given in [Williamson, 2007]. Williamson argues that infinitesimal
numbers cannot assign non-zero probabilities to all non-empty propo-
sitions. In particular, consider the following scenario: Suppose a fair
coin is tossed infinitely many times. Let
H1 : the coin lands on head
H0 : the coin lands on tail
H1... : the coin lands on head on every toss since the first toss
H2... : the coin lands on head on every toss since the second toss
Clearly H1... is doxastically possible, in the sense that we can imagine
a world in which this turns out to be true. However, if the probability
measure is real-valued, then P(H1...) = limn→∞( 12 )
n = 0. Note that
limn→∞( 12 )
n = 0 is true only if the field that we are working with
has the Archimedean property - the property that for every r ∈ R≥0
there exists n ∈ N such that 12n < r.1 Since limn→∞( 12 )n < 12n for
all n ∈ N, it follows that in R (which is an Archemidean field),
limn→∞( 12 )
n = 0. On the other hand, if we extend R to a hyperreal
fieldH by adding hyperreal numbers e such that e < 12n for all n ∈N,
then the fact that limn→∞( 12 )
n < 12n for all n ∈ N no longer implies
that limn→∞( 12 )
n = 0. So it would appear that we can distinguish
between having an infinite sequence of heads from other straightfor-
ward impossibilities by stipulating that P(H1...) = e > 0 where e is
an infinitesimal number.
However, Williamson contends that even if we introduce the in-
finitesimals, we still have to assign 0 to P(H1...). The argument is
given as follows:
1. P(H1...) = P(H1)P(H2...) = 12 P(H2...)
2. P(H1...) = P(H2...)
1 This property is usually formalized as (∀r ∈ R≥0)(∃n ∈ N)[ 1n < r]. But these two
statements are equivalent.
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3. Let P(H1...) = x. Then x = 2x. So x = 0.2
Since 3 follows from 1 and 2, and 1 is warranted by the assumption
that the coin is fair and the tosses are pairwise independent of each
other, the only way of evading Williamson’s conclusion is to reject
premise 2.
Williamson’s argument for 2 is an argument of isomorphism: sup-
pose that we have two fair coins A and B. At time t0, we toss coin
A. For every second thereafter, we toss A and B simultaneously. So
we have two qualitatively indiscernible sequences of coin tosses that
differ only by their starting times. Let H∗1... be the event that coin B
lands on head every single toss since the first toss. Then intuitively
P(H1...) = P(H∗1...).
3 On the other hand, note that the sequence of
tosses of coin B is physically isomorphic to the sequence of tosses
of coin A starting from the second toss. So P(H∗1...) = P(H2...). By
transitivity of identity P(H1...) = P(H2...).
1.2 equinumerosity vs . equiprobability
Hofweber objects to Williamson’s analysis by rejecting the equation
P(H1...) = P(H∗1...). He argues that this equation derives from a fun-
damental confusion between parthood and correspondence. It is a
canonical feature of infinity that a proper subset of an infinite set
could have the same cardinality as the whole set. For example, con-
sider the set of natural numbers N and the set of even numbers 2N.
Every even natural number is a natural number, but not every natural
number is even. So 2N is a part of N. But 2N and N have the same
“size” in the sense that we can construct a bijective map between 2N
and N such that every single natural number is mapped to a unique
even number.
At first glance, it would appear that the equation P(H1...) = P(H∗1...)
comes from a mistaken assumption about the relationship between
equinumerosity and equiprobability. It seems that Williamson is ar-
guing that if two sequences of tosses have the same cardinality with
each other, then they are equiprobable. Hofweber thinks this reason-
ing is fallacious. If this is the basis on which Williamson comes to
2 Note that x = 2x implies that x = 0 for any x ∈ F, where F is a field (including the
hyperreal field). In fact this holds insofar as F is a group, because all we need is for
x to have an additive inverse −x such that we can add the additive inverse of x to
both sides of the equation to get 0 = x.
3 An alternative way to think about this is to consider two people A and B tossing
coins for infinitely many times. Then from a God’s perspective it is intuitive that
the probability that A always get heads is the same as the probability that B always
gets heads. And it shouldn’t matter whether they start tossing their coins at the
same time, in the sense that if we the omniscient and impartial spectator were asked
to compare the relative probability of A getting an infinite sequence of heads and
B getting an infinite sequence of heads, we shouldn’t care whether they started
tossing their coins at the same time. I thank Haimei for suggesting this way of
conceptualizing the thought experiment.
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conclude that P(H1...) = P(H∗1...), then by similar logic the probability
that the coin lands on heads for every million-th toss would be the
same as the probability that the coin lands on heads for every single
toss, which seems absurd. Yet the probability that a coin lands on
head for every milliion-th toss is higher than the probability that a
coin lands on head every single time. So equal cardinality does not
warrant equiprobability. “Measuring chances and sizes of sets are
simply two different things.”(Hofwebwe, 12)
I disagree with Hofweber’s argument on two grounds. First, I think
it has not done justice to Williamson’s argument. Second, I argue that
while there is a way of resisting Williamson’s conclusion, this line of
defense is not available to those who want to defend the primitive-
ness of unconditional probabilities using hyperreal analysis. I shall
first redeem Williamson’s intuition of P(H1...) = P(H∗1...). I then ar-
gue that one can block Williamson’s argument for P(H∗1...) = P(H2...)
by appealing to a notion of relative qualitative differences using com-
parative conditional probabilities.
I think Hofweber’s analysis overlooks two important aspects in
Williamson’s argument. First, recall that Williamson did not conclude
P(H1...) = P(H2...) right away from the fact that there are equal num-
ber of heads in H1... and H2.... Rather, he took a detour by inviting
us to consider two equalities independently: P(H1...) = P(H∗1...) and
P(H∗1...) = P(H2...). He then reasoned that these two equalities hold in
virtue of, not equinumerosity, but physical isomorphism. But equinu-
merosity and isomorphism are not synonyms of every other. The two
notions coincide only in the set-theoretic context where two sets are
isomorphic just in case there is a bijective correspondence between
them. In general, isomorphism is stronger than mere bijective cor-
respondence. For example, two groups are isomorphic if there is a
bijection that preserves their respective group operations; two topo-
logical spaces are isomorphic if the bijection is a continuous, and two
graphs are isomorphic if the bijection preserves the vertex-edge rela-
tionships. In this particular context, one way to make Williamson’s
idea of physical isomorphism more rigorous from an abstract math-
ematical standpoint is by stiuplating that two sequences are isomor-
phic just in case there is a function between the two sequences such
that it is 1-1 and onto, and it preserves the pairwise relations between
two coin tosses. Schematically, let H = ({Hn}n∈N, s) where s is the
successor relation, i.e. s(Hn) = Hn+1. Then H is isomorphic to H∗ iff
there exists
pi : {Hn}n≥1 → {H∗n}n≥1
such that pi(s(Hn)) = s(pi(Hn)).
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In more concrete terms, let H be the sequence of heads generated
by coin A and H∗ be the sequence generated by coin B. Then
H : H1, H2, H3, . . .
H∗ : H∗1 , H∗2 , H∗3 , . . .
and clearly there exists pi : H∗ → H given by pi(H∗n) = Hn.
Similarly, the subsequence H′ = H \ H1 is also structurally isomor-
phic to H∗ via the function p˜i : H∗ → H given by p˜i(H∗n) = Hn+1.
Note that p˜i is indeed a structural isomorphism because p˜i(s(H∗n)) =
p˜i(H∗n+1) = Hn+2 = s(Hn+1) = s(p˜i(H
∗
n)).
Let H106,2×106,... denote the subsequence of every million-th heads
in H. It would appear that there is a similar natural structural iso-
morphism between H106,2×106,... and H∗1.... However, I argue that no
such successor-relation-preserving function exists. To see this, note
that s(Hn×106) = Hn×106+1 6∈ Hn×106 . As a result, for any function
f : H106,2×106,... → H∗1..., we have f (s(Hn×106)) = f (Hn×106+1). Since
Hn×106+1 lies outside of the domain of f . So f (Hn×106+1) is undefined.
All I am trying to motivate here is that H2... is not just any infinite
subsequence of H1.... It is intrinsically different from H106,2×106,... in the
sense that H2... inherits not only the ordering but also the successor
relation from H1....4
It may be objected at this point that my definition of structural
isomorphism is ad hoc. In particular, there is no reason why we can-
not extract the subsequence of H106,2×106,... from the original sequence
H1... and define a new successor function on the sequence, such as
s′(Hn×106) = H(n+1)×106 . I have no objection to this move, except to
point out that the extracted sequence is not the same as the original
subsequence. I shall motivate this claim by considering the following
two cases:
Case 1: Monkey A v. Monkey B
Suppose two monkeys A and B throw two identical coins infinitely
many times. How does the probability that A gets head every single
time compares to B getting head on every million-th toss?
4 Another way of looking at structural isomorphism is that two sequences are isomor-
phic to each other if we can “smoothly” embed one sequence into another without
tearing it apart. To this extent the isomorphism at stake is in fact more of a topo-
logical isomorphism (i.e. homeomorphism): two sets are homeomorphic if there is a
continuous transformation from one set to another that preserves their relative prop-
erties. Two points are close together iff their images in the homeomorphic sets are
also close together. When we map H2... to H∗1..., all we need is a simple translation
that preserves the relative successor relation between any two coin tosses. However,
when we try to map H1... into its subsequence H106 ... qua subsequence of H1..., we have
to tear up the sequence such that the Hn’s become scattered across the sequences
with huge gaps (99999 heads) in between any two original successors. Alternatively
one can think of f , g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] where f (a) = 1 for all 0 ≤ a ≤ 12 and 0 oth-
erwise, whereas g(x) = x. Clearly there is a bijective correspondence between the
images of f and g even though the two images are clearly non-homeomorphic (one
is connected, the other is not.)
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Case 2: Monkey v. Sloth
Suppose a monkey and a sloth toss two identical coins for infinitely
many times. The sloth, being a sloth, tosses the coin one million times
slower than the monkey. How does the probability that the monkey
gets head every single time compares to the probability that the sloth
gets head every single time?
Intuitively, it would appear that the P(Monkey A) < P(Monkey B)
whereas P(Monkey) = P(Sloth), despite that the four events we are
asked to consider are loosely speaking “the same”, i.e. getting an infi-
nite sequence of heads. On Hofweber’s interpretation of Williamson’s
argument, Williamson is committed to saying that P(Monkey A) =
P(Monkey B). Yet if we understand Williamson’s argument as one
based on structural isomorphism properly defined, then there is a
way of reconciling our discrepant intuitions: P(Monkey A) is indeed
smaller than P(Monkey B) because the infinite sequence of heads
produced by Monkey A is not structurally isomorphic to the sub-
sequence produced by Monkey B even if Monkey B also gets head on
every single toss on top of getting heads on every million-th toss.
However, I think structural isomorphism, construed as a successor-
relation-preserving bijection, is still insufficient to warrant Williamson’s
conclusion that H1... and H2... are equiprobable. All it requires is to
ask what is the probability that coin A will land on head every single
time since the million-th toss? Let H106... denote such event. Then
even on the structuralist isomorphism-interpretation of Williamson’s
analysis, H106... would be structurally isomorphic to H1.... So the prob-
ability that a coin lands on head every single time since the first toss
is equal to the probability that a coin lands on head every single
time since the million-th toss. Yet it seems that H(106 . . . ) is clearly
more probable than H1.... So either our intuitions are simply unre-
liable when it comes to infinity, or there is something wrong with
Williamson’s original account.
Instead of resorting to an error theory (which could be true given
that human are notorious when it comes to grappling with arguments
involving infinities), I argue that this is a case in which our intuitions
are justified - H1... is more probable than H2... - if we take conditional
probabilities to be primitive. The analysis is independently given in
[Easwaran, 2014] and [Dorr, 2010]: observe that H1... logically entails
H2... whereas the converse if not true. So
P(H1...|H1... ∨ H2...) = 1
whereas
P(H1...|H1... ∨ H2...) = P(H1|H2...) = 12.
It is worth pointing out that we arrive at these two numerical values
by pure logical analysis rather than appealing to THE RATIO. For if
our probability function is real-valued, then P(H1... ∨ H2...) = 0; if we
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allow for infinitesimal valued probabilities, then Williamson’s analy-
sis suggests that P(H1... ∨ H2...) = P(H1...) = P(H2...) = 0.5 Either
way the condition might have zero probability, which means THE
RATIO would leave both conditional probabilities P(H1...|H1... ∨ H2...)
and P(H1...|H1... ∨ H2...) undefined. 6
But note that in order to make that distinction, one has to resort to a
prior notion of comparative conditional probability. Arguably this is
not a particular problem for Hofweber, whose main project is not so
much to defend THE RATIO or the reducibility of conditional prob-
abilities to unconditional probabilities as to argue that all probability
functions must be regular - that is, the range of probability functions
must be fine-grained enough to capture a modal distinction between
strict impossibility and highly improbable possibilities. On the other
hand, for those who want to defend THE RATIO using hyperreal anal-
ysis, this argument against Williamson actually counts against rather
than in favor of their project. For otherwise one is effectively argu-
ing that conditional probabilities are derivable from unconditional
probabilities but the primitiveness of unconditional probabilities is
justified partially on the ground that the unconditional probabilities
of two events (i.e. H1... and H2...) are differentiable when we compare
their conditional probabilities conditionalized on their disjunctions.
This is not strictly circular, but seems nevertheless an unpalatable po-
sition to take. Instead, I think there are better ways to defend THE
RATIO against Ha´jek’s argument based on the Four Horn Theorem
and seven intuitions, which I shall turn to next.
Before I engage critically with Ha´jek’s argument, there seem to be
at least two ways of interpreting Ha´jek’s main thesis: i) conditional
probabilities are primitive and irreducible to unconditional probabili-
5 Recall that at this junction our goal is to refute Williamson’s equiprobability analysis.
So we would dismiss his proposal on pain of circuitous reasoning.
6 In [Dorr, 2010], Dorr argues that P(A|A ∨ B) 6= P(B|A ∨ B) is insufficient for break-
ing the qualitative symmetry between A and B. He appeals to a distinction between
weak and strong senses of equiprobability (Dorr, 190). Two hypotheses are weakly
equally likely just in case they have equal unconditional probabilities, whereas two
hypotheses are strongly equally likely just in case they are weakly equally likely and
they have equal conditional probabilities when conditionalized on their disjunctions.
Dorr insists that only the weak sense of equiprobability is necessary for qualitative
indiscernibility. The strong sense of likelihood tells us not the individual characteris-
tics of the event per se but the qualitative relations that they bear with each other. The
point is that, when evaluating P(A|A ∨ B), we are restricting ourselves to only the
A-world or B-world. As a result we can only extrapolate the relational or structural
properties of A (with respect to B), as opposed to the intrinsic properties of A all by
itself. A full exposition of this line of defense would go beyond the scope of this
thesis. However, I think the distinction between weak and strong equiprobability
is tenable only if one can provide a coherent account in support of the more fun-
damental distinction between purely individual qualities versus relational qualities.
Lurking behind is the profound metaphysical question: are singular propositions
the primary objects of probabilities, or is probability a feature of a system and indi-
vidual propositions (or more precisely the singular events to which they refer) come
to bear probabilities in virtue of them being part of the system?
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ties7, or ii) THE RATIO is an inadequate analysis of conditional prob-
abilities. In many instances, it appears that Ha´jek is in fact arguing
for ii) rather than i). For example, he thinks Kolmogorov’s extended
analysis of conditional probability using measure-theoretic tools is a
different analytical schema than THE RATIO and therefore does not
count as an objection to his own thesis. To this extent, it seems that
Ha´jek’s sole target is THE RATIO and THE RATIO alone. If this is in
fact what Ha´jek had in mind, then I would agree with Ha´jek’s nega-
tive thesis (that the Ratio Analysis is not an adequate analysis of con-
ditional probability in terms of unconditional probabilities) but only
trivially so. For, to my knowledge, no one - not even Kolmogorov
himself - would think that THE RATIO supplies an adequate analysis
of conditional probabilities for all practical purposes.8 However, at
other places Ha´jek does move to draw a stronger conclusion that we
should replace Kolmogorov’s system by alternative axiomatizations
that take conditional probabilities as primitive. Since ii) is a straw-
man, I shall take the liberty of reinterpreting Ha´jek (perhaps to his
own disagreement) to be arguing against i), or what I shall call the
supervenience thesis or ST9:
(ST) Conditional probability is supervenient on uncondi-
tional probabilities.10
I think there are compelling reasons for this thesis, but I contend
that Ha´jek’s argument is defeasible to the extent that all seven of his
basic intuitions are not universally true for all propositions across
all probability distributions. That is, for each basic intuition about
conditional probability on the list, there is a particular situation in
which the intuition may fail to hold (or at least there is a putative
argument for why it does not have to hold). To this extent, I ar-
gue that our pre-theoreitc intuitions about conditional probabiltiies
are context-dependent. Therefore, contra Ha´jek, I contend that con-
ditional probabilitiies do not have to be well-defined when the con-
textual parameters are not specified. Since Ha´jek rejects THE RATIO
on the sole ground that it leaves a conditional probability undefined
7 Or to be more precise, any available techniques of reducing conditional probabilities
to unconditional probabilities are inadequate. Hence it is incumbent on the de-
tractors to provide a proper reduction of conditional probabilities to unconditional
probabilities.
8 And Ha´jek’s fixation with THE RATIO is even more surprising given that Kol-
mogorov’s entire project is to embed probability theory into the more general math-
ematical framework of measure theory.
9 Since reduction is generally taken to entail supervenience, non-supervenience im-
plies irreducibility (and therefore the negation of i)).
10 There are again two interpretations of ST within the subjectivist framework: the
epistemological interpretation (unconditional credence in AB and A are necessary
and sufficient for the formation of conditional credence in B given that A) and the
analytical interpretation (conditional credence can be analyzed purely in terms of
unconditinal credence). Here I shall constrain myself to the analytical interpretation
of ST. See Appendix II for a discussion on why I think the epistemological version
of ST is untenable.
28 critique of infinitesimal analysis
when it should be well-defined, it follows that Ha´jek’s objection to
THE RATIO is inconclusive.
2
T H E FA L L O F S E V E N I N T U I T I O N S
2.1 intuitions i-iv and the paradoxical set
The first four intuitions on Ha´jek’s list state that upon observing that
A, we should have full belief in A and zero credence in its negation
¬A, whereas our beliefs in necessary truths or falsities should remain
resilient.
However, this turns out to be not universally true for any probabil-
ity space. Inspired by a construction technique used by [G.A.Sherman, 1991],
[Pruss, 2013] proves the following two theorems:
1. Intuitions I-IV are equivalent, i.e. for any given event space Ω
and probability function P, where P could be an unconditional
probability-first function or a conditional probability-first func-
tion,1 we have
P(A|A) = 1 iff P(¬A|A) = 0 iff P(Ω|A) = 1 iff P(∅|A) = 0
By contraposition, we have
P(A|A) = 0 iff P(¬A|A) = 1 iff P(Ω|A) = 0 iff P(∅|A) = 1.
It follows that, as long as there exists one proposition A for
which one of the four intuitions does not hold, then all four
intuitions fail with respect to A.
2. For any probability function P, there exists an event space Ω
such that there is a subset A ⊂ Ω for which P(A|A) = 0.
The fact that A exists is not so surprising in light of the Banach-Tarski
paradox, which says that, given a solid ball B in R3, we can partition
B into finitely disjoint pieces and, under simple translation and rota-
tion, reassemble the pieces into two identical copies of the same ball.
However, the Banach-Tarski paradox is often dismissed by philoso-
phers of probability and especially the subjectivitists because of the
1 I call a probability function “unconditional probability-first” just in case it is a one-
place function that takes in one proposition (e.g. A) at a time and outputs the uncon-
ditional probability of that proposition (e.g. P(A)); a “conditional probability-first”
function, on the other hand, is a two-place function that takes in an ordered pair of
two propositions (e.g. (B,A)) at a time and outputs the conditional probability of one
given the other (e.g. P(B, A) = P(B|A)).
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indispensable role that the Axiom of Choice plays in its construction.2
Unfortunately, this line of objection is not available to Ha´jek here, be-
cause in [G.A.Sherman, 1991] Sherman constructs a set J in R2 that
satisfies similar paradoxical properties as B in R3, i.e. J = U ∪ V
where U ∩V = ∅ and U = J and V = J, without using the Axiom of
Choice. Then for this particular J, we have
P(J|J) = P(U|J) + P(V|J)
= P(J|J) + P(J|J)
= 2P(J|J)3
which implies that P(J|J) = 0.4 So we have a proposition for which
the first basic intuition cannot be true. Since the four intuitions are
logically equivalent, it follows that the other three intuitions are not
universally true either.
What Pruss’ argument really shows that what seem to be “basic”
intuitions about conditional probabilities for Ha´jek are in fact neither
basic nor merely about conditional probabilities per se. Rather, Intu-
ition I-IV reflect our basic assumptions about identity and necessity:
every proposition is self-equivalent and not equivalent to its negation,
and if we are absolutely confident that something is true or false, our
degrees of confidence should be conditionalization-invariant. As we
shall see in 1.7 and more so in part II, identities and necessities are not
always well-respected in formal modelling. In particular, in a formal
model, events are defined with respect to the particular way in which
the model is constructed and represented, and therefore events that
are actually identical may come apart when modelled differently (or
even when they are represented in the same model, as demonstrated
by the foregoing analysis).5
2 Rumor has it that Ron Maimon alleges that the Banach-Tarski paradox does not seem
right because it is actually false - in the sense that it cannot be actualized in physical
experiments.
4 Note that P(J|J) = 2P(J|J) implies that P(J|J) = 0 in virtue of the fact that P(J|J)
is a real number. In fact, all we need is that P(J|J) is an element of a group under
addition, let say r, and thereby has additive inverse “−r”, for then we can add “−r”
to both sides of the equation and get r− r = 0 = 2r− r = r.
5 Another way to look at the upshot of this result is that, as [Myrvold, 2015] points
out in footnote 2, “in probability theory we can’t always get what we want...It is
well-known that there are no probability functions satisfying certain symmetry con-
ditions, countable additivity and the desideratum of having the probability function
defined on arbitrary subsets of our sample space.” (Myrvold, 3) That is, no proba-
bility function could be well-defined on all subsets of a unit circle and at the same
time be countably additive and rotationally invariant. And as [G.A.Sherman, 1991]
and Banach-Tarski’s paradox suggests, one does not really need countable addiv-
itity to get paradoxical results: translational invariance and universal definability
are sufficient for generating unpalatable consequences such as P(J|J) = 0. This
agrees with [McGee, 1989], which shows that there is a correspondence between
conditional-probability-first functions and probability functions that take the hyper-
real numbers rather than R as their ranges (countable additivity does not hold in
hyperreal analysis).
2.2 intuition v and the eternal coin 31
2.2 intuition v and the eternal coin
Intuition V says that the conditional probability of a fair coin land-
ing on Head, given any arbitrary proposition apart from itself and its
own negation, should be 1/2. In particular, this intuition should hold
even if the event on which we conditionalize has probability zero.
[Dorr 2010] presents a intriguing case in which it seems that in some
hypothetical scenarios, conditionalization on a probability-zero event
could increase the probability of the coin landing on Head from 1/2
to 1. Suppose a fair coin is thrown once a day for infinitely many days,
both in the past and in the future (assuming that there are infinitely
many days in the past and infinitely many days in the future). As-
sume in addition that each toss is independent of every other. So the
probability of the coin landing on head for each toss is presumably
1/2. Now let
F : the coin lands on head for every single toss in the future.
P : the coin lands on head for every single toss in the past.
H : the coin lands on head today.
T : the coin lands on tail today.
What is the probability that the coin will land on head today, given
that it will land on head for every single day in the future, i.e. what
is P(H|F)?
According to Ha´jek, this probability should be 1/2 despite the fact
that P(F) = 0. This seems intuitively true by virtue of the setup:
we are told in the assumption that the coin is fair and the turnout
of each toss is probabilistically independent of every other. So the
number of heads that we have gotten in the past or will get in the
future shouldn’t bias the coin towards landing on head or tail today.
However, Dorr argues that the conditional probability should be 1 in-
stead of 1/2, and he presents two arguments for this counterintuitive
conclusion.
2.2.1 Argument 1: Self-locating indifference
The principle of self-locating indifference is essentially a requirement
of objective temporal impartiality in the absence of discriminating ev-
idences. To put it schematically, the principle says that, if the subject
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cannot tell what time it is, then she ought to distribute her credence
equally between all possible times. Now let
K0 : today will be the last Tail-day and the coin will land on head every
single day starting from tomorrow(i.e. K0 = TF)
Kn : today will be the n-day of an infinite run of heads
K∞ : the coin lands on heads every day, past, present and future
Observe that Kn implies H for all n ∈ Z≥1. Moreover, the event
that the coin lands on head every single day in the future can be
represented as a disjunction of two centered propositions: the coin
lands on head every single day in the future and today is the last
tail day, or the coin lands on head every single day in the future and
today is the n-th day since the last tail day for some n greater than or
equal to 1. So F ≡ K0 ∨ (K1 ∨ K2 ∨ K3 ∨ . . . ) ∨ K∞.
But now suppose that we are drugged immediately after each toss.
After we wake up the next day, we remember neither the date of to-
day, nor the toss result of the previous day. Presumably this shouldn’t
affect our conditional credence in the coin landing on head today,
given that it lands on head every single day in the future, since that
assessment appears to require no information about the past behav-
ior of the coin. However, due to our memory loss, we cannot tell
whether we had head or tail yesterday, which makes us incapable of
adjudicating, given that the coin will land on head every single day
in the future, whether today will be the last tail day or some day in
the middle of this infinite sequence of heads. As a result, by prin-
ciple of self-locating indifference, we should assign deem that all Ki
are equally likely to be true. So P(K0|K0 ∨ K1 ∨ K2 ∨ · · · ∨ Kn) < 1n
for all n ∈ Z≥1. By the Archimedian property of the real num-
ber, it follows that P(K0|F) = 0.6 But recall that K0 = TF. So
P(TF|F) = P(T|F) = 0. By law of total probability, this means that
P(H|F) = 1− P(T|F) = 1− 0 = 1.7
6 Note that the particular Archimedian property of the real numbers is not crucial in
this argument. After all, even if we introduce hyperreal numbers e such that e < 1n
for all n ∈ Z≥1, we would end up with P(T|F) = e and P(H|F) = 1− e where e is
infinitesimal. This is still far off from our original intuition that P(H|F) = 1/2.
7 The acute reader might be skeptical at this point about the applicability of the prin-
ciple of self-locating indifference. After all, K1 and K2 do not have the same infor-
mational content: K1 makes assumptions about the coin toss results for yesterday,
today and every single day in the future, whereas K2 makes assumptions about the
coin toss results for the day before yesterday, yesterday, today and every single day in
the future. Pictorially,
K1 : THHHH . . .
K2 : THHHHH . . .
where H stands for the prediction that the coin will land on head today. Given that
the coin is fair and each toss is presumably independent of every other, from an
objective standpoint, the probability of K2 should be smaller than the probability of
K1. And similarly P(Ki) > P(Kj) for all i < j. This is one reason why I find the
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2.2.2 Argument 2: Conditional Probability as Primitive
Dorr’s second analysis seems harder to resist and presents a special
challenge to Ha´jek, who endorses conditional probability-first proba-
bility functions. Dorr proposes the following three principles: Let P+
be the probability function that you will have tomorrow, conditional
on the setup. Then
P+(HF|P ∨ HF) = P(F|HP ∨ F) (1)
P+(P|P ∨ HF) = P(HP|HP ∨ F) (2)
P+(HF|P ∨ HF) = P(HF|P ∨ HF) (3)
P+(P|P ∨ HF) = P(P|P ∨ HF) (4)
P(P ∨ HF) > 0 and P(F|P ∨ F) > 0 (5)
In addition, assume that the multiplicative axiom for conditional prob-
ability holds
P(A|C) = P(A|B)P(B|C)
whenever AC entails B and B entails C.
Then by pure algebraic manipulation, we get P(H|F) = 1P(H|P) . But
since P(H|F) ≤ 1 and P(H|P) ≤ 1, it follows that the only possible
values for P(H|F) and P(H|P) are 1.
Admittedly Dorr’s analysis is not irresistable. To name but one ob-
jection to Dorr’s argument, as we shall see in part II, the axiom of
multiplicative axiom is not universally true and its veracity depends
on the particular stochastic dependency relationship among A, B and
C. However, I think the Eternal Coin presents an interesting case that
motivates my general concern for Ha´jek’s argument, namely that our
pre-theroetic intuitions about conditional probabilities are largely in-
formed by and therefore highly sensitive to the particular way in
which we model and represent the given scenario in our mind. For
instance, one can provide a qualitative justification for Dorr’s analysis
as follows: if we were to actually believe that the coin lands on head
every single day in the future, it is very hard to hold onto our initial
belief that the coin is in fact unbiased and therefore has equal proba-
bilitis of landing on head or tail for today. Rather, it seems tempting
to conclude that the probability that the coin will land on head, given
that it will land on head every single day in the future, is likely to be
1. In this sense, P(H|F) = 1 is a particular instance of abductive rea-
soning in probability assessment that I shall explore more in details
in part II.
second argument a better argument for Dorr’s central thesis, namely that P(H|F) =
1. More in-depth analysis would require getting into the debate about the principle
of self-locating indifference, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.3 intuition vi and symmetry
Intuition VI says that, let x be a number chosen from the interval [0, 1]
at random, then the conditional probability that x = 1/4, given that
x = 1/4 or x = 3/4 is 1/2.
Presumably, this intuition comes from our assumption about uni-
form probability distribution. Since the probability distribution is
uniform, each point in the interval [0, 1] is no more and no less likely
to be selected than every other point. In particular, the probability
P(x = 1/4) = P(x = 3/4). In addition, since point is chosen at ran-
dom, the event that 1/4 is selected is probabilistically independent of
and mutually incompatible to the event that 3/4 is selected. Hence
the probability of their disjunction equals to the sum of their individ-
ual probabilities: P(x = 1/4 ∨ x = 3/4) = P(x = 1/4) + P(1 = 3/4).
Let the probability P(x = 1/4) = P(1 = 3/4) = r where r is some
























Now let y be another real number chosen from the interval [0, 1]
with a probability density function of 2y. Then our intuition about
this new skewed probability distribution suggests that it is more





















Yet observe that x is uniformly distributed just in case
√
x is dis-
tributed with a probability density function of 1/2. So if we let
y =
√
x, then y = 1/2 iff x = 1/4 and y =
√
3/2 iff x = 1/4,
8 This looks very much like the infinitesimal analysis, which is why it seems an ap-
pealing solution to Ha´jek’s objections against THE RATIO. However, as I hope to
have shown in chapter 1, if the goal of introducing infinitesimal numbers is to save
THE RATIO and in general the thesis that unconditinoal probabilities are more
fundamental than conditional probabilities, then Williamson’s argument seems to
suggest that this cannot cannot be done convincingly. In some cases (such as the
1-direction eternal coin, in contrast with Dorr’s case of two-direction eternal coin
that we shall discuss shortly), rather than deducing equal comparative likelihood
from equiprobability, we derive the latter from the former. And in general, as Dorr
and Easwaran point out independently, equal comparative probability captures an
aspect of the relational property between two events that is indescribable in a purely
unconditinoal probability-based analysis. Easwaran, in particular, goes further to
suggest that likelihood could be a partial ordering rather than total ordering, and
this goes against the fundamental assumption of unconditional probability-based
analysis, which treats likelihoods and probabilities interchangeably and takes equal
likelihoods as a direct fallout of the total ordering of probabilities.
9 One way to visualize this change is to imagine an infinitely thin dart thrown on a
line AB of length 1, and instead of having the line of uniform width, in the second
case the line is infinitely thin at A and becoming uniformly thicker and thicker as one
approaches B. Thus, intuitively it is more likely to select points nearer B as opposed
to points nearer to A.
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i.e. the events that y = 1/2 and x = 1/4 are equiprobable, and are
y =
√
3/2 and x = 3/4. Thus, if equiprobability implies equal com-
parative conditional probabilities,10 then
P(y = 1/2|y = 1/2 or y =
√
3/2) = P(x = 1/4|x = 1/4 or x = 3/4)
= P(x = 3/4|x = 1/4 or x = 3/4)
= P(y =
√














































What went wrong? I argue that the discrepancy between our two
intuitions come down to the differences in our mental representations
of a “point.” First, observe that we can in fact redeem our intuitions
about the inequality between the two conditional probabilities as fol-
lows.
























10 The reader might be slightly confused here since I have also talked about the con-
nection between equiprobability and equal comparative probabilities (or compara-
tive likelihoods in short) in my previous analysis of Williamson’s argument against
the use of infinitesimal numbers. To clarify things a little bit, recall that what we
have argued in the Williamson’s section is that one can use asymmetrical likelihood
(i.e. P(p|p ∨ q) < P(q|p ∨ q)) to justify asymmetrical unconditional probabilities of
p and q (thus assigning different infinitesimal numbers to P(p) and P(q)). And this
conclusion seems palatable given our intuition that the unconditional probability of
getting an infinite sequence of heads starting from today is lower (however more
slightly) than the unconditional probability of getting an infinite sequence of heads
starting from tomorrow. Thus in my analysis I gestures to the assumption that
unequal comparative conditional probabilities could imply unequal unconditional
probabilities, and by contraposition this is the same as saying that equiprobability
implies equal comparative conditional probabilities.


































Note that in this analysis, we effectively conceptualize the points 1/2
and
√
3/2 as limits of two intervals of infinitesimal but equal lengths
(i.e. [1/2 − e, 1/2 + e] and [√3/2 − e,√3/2 + e]). Since the prob-
ability distribution is skewed, intervals of the same length are not
equiprobable. So on this conception of the “points” 1/2 and 3/2 we







3/4, while imagining 1/4 and 3/4 as
two limits of infinitesimal intervals of equal lengths, then when we
translate this imagining back to our conception of 1/2 and
√
3/2 we
no longer have them as limits of intervals of equal length. To put


























2ydy = 2e. Therefore P(y =
1/2) = P(y =
√
3/2).11 The upshot is similar to what we observe
from Pruss’ paradoxical sets: our pre-theoretic intuitions about con-
ditional probabilities are informed by and thereby contingent on the
way in which we represent the events in terms of abstract models
and how we subsequently reason about their relative identities or the
symmetry/asymmetry in their qualitative relationships. I shall speak
more to this point in the next section, where I shall cast doubt on the
seventh and last intuition on Ha´jek’s list - the intuition that randomly
selected point on a sphere will land in the western hemisphere, given
that it lands on the equator, is 1/2.
2.4 intuition vii and the borel-kolmogorov paradox
Intuition VII goes as follows: consider a uniform sphere. Let B be a
great circle (the black arc in the picture), and R be a subarc of length
1/4 of B (the red arc in the picture - it is easy to see that if one end
of R is the North Pole, then the other end of R is at 45◦ to the xy-
11 I thank Professor Jonathan Tannenhauser for pointing out this fallacy to me.
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plane). Let ω be a point selected at random on the sphere. What is
the probability that ω lands on R, given that it lands on B?
As the reader might expect from our discussion in the previous
section, there are two solutions to this problem that are nonetheless
incompatible with each other. On the one hand, it seems intuitive
that
P(R|B) = length of R
length of B
= 1/4.
Let’s call this the arc-length solution. On the other hand, we can rein-
terpret R as the intersection between the chosen great circle (in this
case, B) and the points with latitude of at least 45◦ north. Then
P(R|B) = P(latitude ≥ 45◦|B) (i.e. the probability that ω lands on R,
given that it lands on B, equals to the probability that ω has a latitude
of at least 45◦, given that it lands on B). Now let B′ be another great
circle and R′ be the corresponding subarc that starts from the North
Pole and ends at the point with a latitude of 45◦. It is not hard to see
that P(R′|B′) = P(latitude ≥ 45◦|B′) = P(latitude ≥ 45◦|B). Since
this equation holds for any great circle that passes through the two
poles, it follows that P(latitude ≥ 45◦|B) is independent of the choice
of B, which implies that
P(latitude ≥ 45◦|B) = P(latitude ≥ 45◦)
=
surface area bounded by the circle of latitude 45◦
surface area of the entire sphere
.
Let’s call this the surface area solution. Since in general
surface area bounded by the circle of latitude 45◦
surface area of the entire sphere
6= 1/4,
the arc-length solution does not generally agree with the surface area
solution. So like the previous case with 1/2 and
√
3/2, here we have
two seemingly impeccable analyses that nevertheless recommend two
competing intuitions about what P(R|B) ought to be.
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One quick response to this objection is that the paradox is a red
herring. Of course the arc-length solution is right. The surface area so-
lution seems rather contrived and counter-intuitive.12 This is perhaps
what makes Easwaran feel unsatisfied with the traditional presenta-
tion of the paradox. Instead, he contends “the [surface area solution]
is basically correct” based on the following theorem that he proves:
Theorem Let B = Bα be the collection of all great circles. Let A be
the surface area of the sphere that consists of all points with latitude
of at least 45◦. Assume that there is a probability P(A|Bα) for each
Bα ∈ B. Let
S = {Bα ∈ B|P(A|Bα) 6= P(A)}.
Then P(S) = 0.
Observe that S is the set of all great circles for which P(A|Bα) 6=
P(A), i.e. for which the surface-area solution is incorrect. By show-
ing P(S) = 0, Easwaran thereby takes himself to have demonstrated
that there are very few if any great circles B for which the surface-area
solution is not the correct way of computing the conditional probabil-
ity of P(A|B), where A is an arbitrary surface selected on the sphere.
Thus he concludes that the paradoxicality of the Borel-Kolmogorov
case lies not in a standoff between two “right” solutions but in the fact
that the generalization of the “correct” solution (namely the surface-
area solution) leads to a trilemma of itself.
However, note that, as Easwaran himself cautiously admits, the fact
that P(S) = 0 only means that P(A|Bα) must equal to P(A) almost ev-
erywhere, i.e. that the set of great circles for which P(A|Bα) 6= P(A)
has measure zero in the given probability measure. Easwaran con-
cludes that “[t]his is exactly what [the surface area solution] said”.
Yet it is not. The surface area solution says that the conditional prob-
ability of P(R|B) = P(A ∪ B|B) = P(A|B) = P(A) for all great circles
B and surface area A. And measure theory tells us that the differ-
ence between “everywhere” and “almost everywhere” may be very
big. For example, if we endow the set of real numbers between 0 and
1 with a uniform (probability) measure, then the probability that a
randomly selected point in this interval is a rational number would
be zero, despite the fact that the set of rational numbers is countably
infinite and dense in the given probability space.
In fact, Easwaran’s theorem should hardly take us by surprise in
light of the first horn of Ha´jek’s Four Horn Theorem: recall that the
Four Horn Theorem says that for any uncountable set (in this case
the set B is clearly uncountable), any (real-valued, sharp) probability
measure must fail to assign positive probability to uncountably many
subsets of B. To this extent, I argue that Easwaran’s proof cannot
12 One may raise the same objection against the second argument in the previous sec-
tion that reasons by equating y with
√
x.
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count as a proper vindication of the surface-area solution of the Borel-
Kolmogorov paradox, and to argue otherwise is to be guilty of the
fallacious reasoning of equating impossibility with zero-probability
possibility.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then a positive case remains to
be made for the surface area solution given its relative unnaturalness.
I think [Rescorla, 2015] has in fact provided us with a compelling
defense for the surface area solution.
[Rescorla, 2015] observes that the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox takes
the following form:
1. P(R|B) = r (the arc-length solution)
2. P(R|B′) = r′ (the surface-area solution)
3. B = B′
4. P(R|B) = P(R|B′)
5. r 6= r′
In response, Rescorla points out that the argument is unsound be-
cause 3 is false: the great circle B responsible for P(R|B) = r is not
exactly identical to the great circle B′ that gives the conditional prob-
ability P(R|B′) = r′. They are two different “representational per-
spectives” of the same mathematical entity given by two different
parametrization metrics of the sphere (i.e. what constitute the collec-
tion B). If we partition the sphere into a collection of meridians, then
each meridian can be represented as a limit of the area enclosed by
two of its neighboring meridians that are infinitely close to each other.
In this case, since the surface area is not uniformly distributed across
this area, it follows that the probability distribution across the chosen
meridian itself cannot be uniform either. On the other hand, if we
partition the sphere into a collection of parallel circles (lines of con-
stant latitude), with the chosen great circle B as the equator, then we
can represent B as the limit of the strip enclosed by two parallels in
its neighbourhood. Since the area of the strip is uniformly distributed
across the sphere, it follows that the probability distribution across B
should also be uniform. In short, this is consistent with and in fact
exactly what I was foreshadowing in my previous analysis of y = 1/2
and y =
√
3/2 - in both cases, because the events on which we condi-
tionalize (a point or a point landing on a great circle of a sphere) are
microscopic, and the traditional strategy of modelling microscopic
events is by defining them as formal limits of some perceivable sets,
the conditional probabilities come out differently depending on what
sets or parametric we use to conceptualize these microscopic events.
In such cases, as Rescorla points out, “the locution ‘P(·|A)’ creates
an opaque context” that forbids uncritical substitution of entities in
virtue of their co-extensiveness.
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Arguably, the last two sections are not so much proofs that Ha´jek’s
basic intuitions about conditional probabilities are wrong, as evidence
suggesting that there is much more going on behind these intuitions.
Specifically, intuitions VI and VII - and in fact to a large extent all
seven intuitions - are reflective of and derivative from our more fun-
damental intuitions about the relationship between identity, compar-
ative likelihoods and equiprobability. But, at least in the subjectivist
context, these four notions need not go hand in hand. The same phys-
ical entity can admit of different and sometimes incompatible abstract
formalizations. As a result, two abstract entities that correspond to
the same physical entity need not be equally probable across all mod-
elling perspectives.
3
S U M M A RY A N D S Y N T H E S I S
I have argued that all seven of Ha´jek’s purported “basic” intuitions
about conditional probabilities can be violated or at least fail to be
generalized. To this extent, it seems that in these cases, conditional
probabilities are not necessarily well-defined, but only well-defined
with respect to a specified range of propositions and against a de-
termined contextual parameter. In this sense, it is the conditional-
probability-first functions, rather than THE RATIO, that is guilty of
“sins of omissions”- by insisting that all conditional probabilities must
be sharp, such functions fail to capture the innate dependency of con-
ditional probabilities on context and mental representations. So THE
RATIO could be correct after all - when conditionalized on micro-
scopic events, the value of conditional probabilities can be genuinely
underdetermined to the extent extraneous contextual information is
required for specifying in what way the events are represented and
related stochastically.
However, note that this is an argument in favor of THE RATIO and
yet against ST. If the contextualist analysis is correct, then what it
highlights is precisely the fact that conditional probabilities are not
supervenient on unconditional probabilities, in the sense that spec-
ification of two well-defined unconditional probabilites may leave
the corresponding conditional probabilities genuinely undeterdeter-
mined and therefore undefined. While Ha´jek takes instances where
THE RATIO leaves conditional probabilities undefined as a reason in
support of the negation of ST (and subsequently his positive thesis
that conditional probabilities are more primitive than unconditional
probabilities), I argue that this logic is inherently flawed - not only is
THE RATIO consistent with the idea that conditional probabilities are
more primitive than unconditional probabilities, but that it literally
gestures to the fact that in some cases a full specification of uncon-
ditional probabilities may nevertheless leave conditional probabilities
“undefined”! To this extent, the output of “undefined” is something
worthy of deep reflection rather than a quick rectification.
I have argued that, when computing P(B|A) where A is micro-
scopic (i.e. P(A) = 0 if P is real-valued), there could be more than
one admissible numerical assignment for P(B|A) depending on the
way in which we conceptualize A and the stochastic dependency re-
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lation between A and B. One question then arises is whether we can
generalize this observation to discrete cases where P(A) 6= 0. My
answer is yes, and I shall justify my conclusion in part II by sketching
a semantic account of conditional probabilities and probabilities of
conditionals.
Part III
C O N D I T I O N A L P R O B A B I L I T Y A N D T H E
T H E S I S
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To my knowledge, there are two dominant semantic accounts of
conditional credence: the counterfactual account (proposed by Lowe)
and the suppositional account (proposed by Edgington). I argue that
the counterfactual account is in general untenable, whereas the sup-
positional account is basically correct but requires work to unpack
the notion of supposition carefully. In particular, I argue that the
conditional probability of B given that A varies depending on the
specific manner and order in which we make our supposition about
A in relation to our other background beliefs. To this extent, condi-
tional probability P(B|A) is a hypothetical probability that we assign
to B within the suppositional context centered on A that is itself de-
termined by our background beliefs and other contextual variables
not encoded in A and AB. On this account, our previous observa-
tion about the context-dependency of P(B|A) when A is microscopic
therefore turns out to be a special case of a general phenomenon and




T H E C O U N T E R FA C T U A L A C C O U N T
One seemingly plausible semantic account of conditional probability
is given by [Lowe, 1996], who posits that the conditional probability
P(B|A) = x just in case, if P(A) = 1, then P(B) = x. It is worth point-
ing out that on one interpretation of Lowe’s account of conditional
probability, THE THESIS (P(B given that A)=P(if A then B)) is ana-
lytically true: it seems plausible that a rational agent’s subjective cre-
dence in the conditional “if A then B” shares an intimate relationship
with her hypothetical credence in B upon adjusting her credence in A
to be 1. So P(if A, then B)=x iff P(if P(A) = 1, then P(B) = x) = 1 iff
P(P(B|A) = x) = 1 iff P(B|A) = x.
Lowe concedes that sometimes the conditional probability of B
given that A does not necessarily correspond to the probability that B
would have if the probability of A were 1. To use Lowe’s own example
(which he borrowed from [Edgington, 1996]), I may have high degree
of conditional belief that I won’t know that my office is bugged given
that it is the CIA who are bugging my office; yet if I were to believe
that the CIA are bugging my office, then my degree of belief in me
not knowing that my office is bugged is effectively zero. To put this
schematically, let
C : The CIA is bugging my office.
K : I know that my office is bugged.
Then one may have high value for P(¬K|C). Yet since knowing
that C implies K, one must have low value for P(¬K) if P(C) = 1
(recall that here we take probability to denote the degree of credence
and therefore P(C) = 1 iff one is certain about C). So P(¬K|C) and
P(¬K) if P(C) = 1 come apart, which contradicts Lowe’s proposed
definition of conditional probability.
In response, [Lowe, 2008] argues that the force of this counterexam-
ple depends on “an irrelevant indexical first-person characterization
of the belief in question.” (Lowe, 610) He notes that the reason why
one has high degree of conditional belief in ¬K given that C is be-
cause one believes that, “given that the CIA are bugging any ordinary
citizen’s office, that citizen won’t know about it” (Lowe, 610, origi-
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nal italics) and I stand in no exceptional epistemic position to know
otherwise. In other words, let
Cx : the CIA are bugging x’s office
Kx : x knows that her office is bugged
Then C and K are just special cases of Cx and Kx where x is ‘I’. So
the argument goes as follows:
1. If I believe that the CIA are bugging someone’s office (i.e. P(Cx) =
1), then I think it is highly probable that that person won’t know
about it (i.e. P(¬Kx) is high).
2. So P(¬Kx|Cx) corresponds with the value of P(¬Kx) if P(Cx) =
1. Or we can formalize it using predicate logic as follows:
(∀x)[P(¬Kx|Cx) = p iff P(¬Kx) = p if P(Cx) = 1]
3. Since I am no exception in this regard, by universal substitution
we have:
P(¬Ki|Ci) = p iff P(¬Ki) = p if P(Ci) = 1
where i stands for “I”.
In other words, Lowe thinks what is responsible for the discrepancy
between the counterfactual probability of ¬K (if P(C) were 1) and the
conditional probability of ¬K given that C is true, is a more general
disagreement between our high counterfactual probabilities for ¬Kx
if P(Cx) were 1 and low counterfactual probabilities for ¬K if P(C)
were 1. But this disagreement arises from poor reasoning involving
first-person indexicals that has nothing to do with the counterfactual
account of conditional credence in particular. Therefore, Lowe thinks
the objection does not apply once we figure out the true culprit that
is messing up with our intuitions about hypothetical probabilities.
I argue that Lowe’s universal-deduction analysis is plausible but
cannot be the whole story. Observe that the universal-deduction anal-
ysis can only account for sentences that are in fact true for anyone
irrespective of her particular identity. That is, it only holds for propo-
sitions that are particular instantiations of some general beliefs. Yet
not all propositions have universal generalizations. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following sentence:
I am the only one on earth who believes that Jo is not a
liar, even if Jo lies to me.
the counterfactual account 49
Let
B : I believes Jo is not a liar.
L : Jo lies to me.
In this case I have high degree of conditional belief that I believe Jo
is not a liar given that Jo lies to me (i.e. my P(B|L) is high). Yet if we
adopt Lowe’s definition of conditional probability, then my degree
of conditional belief should be given by my hypothetical degree of
belief that I believe Jo is not a liar, if I were certain that Jo lies to me.
This should be effectively zero, for otherwise I would be certain that
she lies to me and yet believes that it is probable that she is not a liar,
which seems a prima facie contradiction.
And Lowe’s universal-deduction analysis won’t help in this case
either. For let
Bx : x believes Jo is not a liar.
Lx : Jo lies to x.
Then note that in this case I am indeed in a special epistemic position
different from everyone else: I am by hypothesis the only one on
earth for whom P(Bx|Lx) is high (or at least I believe it as such).
So I must not have determined my degree of conditional belief in B
given that L from my degree of conditional belief in the universal
characterization (∀x)P(Bx|Cx). The universal-deduction story could
not avail the counterfactual theory in this particular case, and this - I
argue - is indeed the true force of the original CIA-counterexample:
the counterfactual characterization of conditionalization rules out a
priori certain sets of second-order conditional predictions about our
epistemic states. By stipulating that an agent’s conditional credence
P(B|A) is given by her unconditional credence in B if she is fully
confident in A, the theory fails to account for cases in which the
proposition B stands in tension with the agent having full belief in
A. In other words, the counterfactual theory requires that, when
evaluating the conditional “if A then B,” the subject makes not only
1 but 2 assumptions: a) A is true and b) I believe that A is true. As
the previous examples aim to show, the second supposition about our
own epistemic stance towards the antecedent is not only superfluous
but in fact wrong.
But then the question arises: if assumptions a) and b) are in fact dis-
tinct, how then should a) inform or interact with b), i.e. how should
assuming that A is true affect our doxastic attitudes towards A (as
well as its logical or causal implications)?
Before I turn to this question, I want to raise one last point about
Lowe’s universal-deduction analysis. While I think it fails to save
the counterfactual theory of conditional probability in its generality,
it has its own virtue and does point to an interesting discrepancy
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between third-person and first-person evaluation of counterfactual
probabilities, which I won’t be able to explore in detail without di-
gressing too much. Recall that Lowe is effectively arguing that, the
first-person indexical confuses our judgment of counterfactual proba-
bilities. For example, consider the second sentence with “I” replaced
by “A”, where “A” stands for the speaker to whom “I” presumably
refers, i.e.
A is the only one on earth who believes that Jo is not a liar,
even if Jo lies to A.
Then the speaker’s subjective conditional probability in A believ-
ing that Jo is not a liar (BA), given that Jo lies to A (LA), is high. What
about her hypothetical unconditional credence in BA, if she were to
be certain that LA? In this case my own intuition seems less clear and
does in fact pull in both directions. On the one hand, the speaker is
conscious of the fact that she is in fact A and therefore for her, to say
“Jo lies to A” is the same as saying that “Jo lies to me”. On the other
hand, suppose the speaker is instead watching a film that features
a protagonist who is exactly identical to her - they share the same
name, family backgrounds, personal histories, physical traits, etc. In
this case, I think the speaker can believe that “Jo lies to A” without
believing that “Jo lies to me.”While this scenario seems wildly im-
plausible, all I am trying to motivate here is that by substituting the
first-person indexical with a name, Jo might be able to step back and
evaluate the sentence from an impartial spectator’s perspective and
therefore dissociate her second-order belief from her first-order belief:
she may believe what Jo says and disbelieve that what Jo says is believ-
able. In the second case, hypothetically adjusting one’s credence in
LA to 1 won’t trivialize her unconditional credence in BA, and Lowe’s
prediction about the correspondence between P(BA|LA) and P(BA) if
P(LA) were 1 may come out true after all. While I shall not be delving
into this question further for the interest of space, I think this is an
interesting question and further research on how indexicals are to be
treated in evaluations of conditionals and conditional probability may
shed interesting light on the nature of supposition and the ontology
of the objects of our beliefs.1
1 Partly inspired by this first-person/third-person discrepancy, I wonder if Lowe’s
counterfactual definition could be saved by making the following adjustments:
CT’ the conditional probability P(B|A) = x just in case, if P(ch(A)) =
1, then P(B) = x
where ch(A) stands for the chance of A. This would be equivalent to Lowe’s origi-
nal formulation if we also subscribe to Lewis’ Principal Principle, which relates the
agent’s subjective probability and objective chance as follows
P(A|ch(A) = x) = x.
While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to explore this possibility in full details,
my intuition is that the Principal Principle won’t necessarily hold in the supposi-
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tional context for the mere reason that we seem to be able to suppose things that we
believe to be impossible (physically or even metaphysically). Consider, for example,
the following sentence:
If Jo falls into the Black Hole, then I won’t know about it.
If 1+ 1 = 0, then I’ll lose my faith in everything.
In both cases, when evaluating the conditional, it seems that we are adjusting our
beliefs in the objective chance of the antecedent without actually modifying our
epistemic stance towards the proposition accordingly. If there is still some lingering
doubt, I think the hypothetical acceptance-categorical acceptance distinction in the
next section might help clarify things a bit more.

5
T H E S U P P O S I T I O N A L A C C O U N T
I have argued that the counterfactual account as proposed by Lowe
cannot give a coherent account of conditional probabilities where
there is a tension between believing the consequent and having full
belief in the antecedent.
Now, according to [Ramsey, 2010],
“If two people are arguing ‘if p will q?’ and both are in
doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their
stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We
can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q
given p.”
Inspired by the quotation from Ramsey, [Edgington, 1995] proposes
an alternative account of conditional probability, which seems to fare
better in this respect:
(Suppositional Account) P(B|A) = x just in case P(B) =
x on the supposition that A is true.
Note that the advantage of this account is that it does not specify
what epistemic attitude one ought to take when supposing that A,
and therefore it is invulnerable to counterexamples to the counter-
factual account where P(B) = 0 whenever one believes A to be true.
However, the lack of specificity can also be viewed as a disadvantage
of this account to the extent that it is then open to interpretations
which may themselves lead to unpalatable consequences. I shall ad-
dress one such case in order to motivate my own modified supposi-
tional account of conditional credence.
5.1 ramsey + moore = god
One way to interpret the quotation from Ramsey is to take it as speci-
fying an acceptability condition for indicative conditionals as follows:
(Acceptability Condition) “If p then q” is acceptable to a
subject S just in case were S to accept p and consider q, S
would accept q.1
1 I owe this formulation of the acceptability condition to [Chalmers& Ha´jek, 2007]
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This formulation should remind us of Lowe’s counterfactual defini-
tion of conditional probability. Indeed, since Ramsey seems to think
that “if p then q” is acceptable just in case the probability of q given
that p is sufficiently high, the acceptability condition can be read as
equivalent to Lowe’s counterfactual definition of conditional probabil-
ity. To this extent, one variant of the suppositional account actually
coincides with the counterfactual account. The reader may then rea-
sonably expect it to be vulnerable to the same worry as mentioned in
the previous section. While I think this is in fact true, I shall present
an alternative objection given by [Chalmers and Ha´jek, 2007] so as to
provide enough theoretical resources to motivate my own account.2
However, if this acceptability condition of indicative conditionals is
the correct interpretation of the quotation from Ramsey, then it would
appear that all rational agents must be omniscient and infallible. For
let p be any proposition and consider the following sentences:
1. If p, then I accept that p.
2. If I accept that p, then p.
According to the Acceptability Condition, 1 is acceptable to a sub-
ject S just in case, were S to accept p, then S would accept that “I
accept that p”. Similarly 2 is acceptable to a subject S just in case,
were S to accept that she accepts that p, then she would accept that p.
But by Moorean principles of rationality,
(Moore’s Principle I) If an agent accepts that p, then she
accepts that she accepts that p.
and
(Moore’s Principle II) If an agent accepts that she accepts
that p, then she accepts that p.
So the Acceptability Condition, together with the two Moorean
principle of rationality, jointly implies that 1 and 2 are true for any
rational agents. Yet 1 and 2 are true just in case for every proposition
2 It is not an automatic equivalence because the relationship between probability and
acceptability remains controversial. The conventional thought is that a proposition A
is acceptable to a subject S just in case S’s subjective probability for A is sufficiently
high. This position has come under attack recently especially in light of the lottery
paradox: let 1− 1, 000, 000 be lottery numbers, one of which is randomly selected as
the winning number. When a subject buys a ticket with number n, the probability
that n is not the winning number is given by 999,9991,000,000 , which is very high. Yet it
seems that the sentence “this number is not the winning number” could still be
unacceptable, in the sense that its modal negation “this number may be the winning
number” is acceptable (on the assumption that these two sentences cannot be both
acceptable, for otherwise their conjunction “this number is not the winning number
and it may be the winning number” should also be acceptable, which seems absurd).
Note that no matter what threshold one uses as the cutting edge for (un)acceptability,
one can choose a big enough number for the number of lottery tickets such that the
probability that each particular number is the winning number is small enough.
5.2 ramsey + moore 6= god 55
p, it is true just in case the agent accepts it to be true. That is, the
agent accepts every true proposition, and her mere acceptance of a
proposition is sufficient for it to be true, i.e. she is omniscient and
infallible. “So the Ramsey test and Moorean reasoning entail that ra-
tional subjects should accept that they have the epistemic powers of
a god.”[Chalmers and Ha´jek, 2007]
5.2 ramsey + moore 6= god
The only two ways of blocking this argument seem to be 1) rejecting
Chalmer and Ha´jek’s formulation of the Acceptability Condition of
indicative conditionals, or 2) rejecting the two Moorean principles
of rationality. Since the two Moorean principles appear prima facie
correct, 3 I shall constrain myself to the evaluation of the Acceptability
Condition. 4
3 This is not to say that they are uncontroversial. For example, given the semblance
between acceptance and belief, it seems reasonable to suppose that acceptance could
be dispositional and non-transparent. To this extent, the two principles may not hold
in general just like knowledge and knowledge of knowledge or belief and belief of
belief do not necessarily mutually imply each other. For example, due to ideolog-
ical indoctrination an agent may actually accept that women are less intellectually
competent than men, but, unaware of her own implicit stereotype, declines to accept
that she accepts that women are less intellectually competent than men. However,
I think the caveat of dispositional acceptance does not quite apply in this particu-
lar case because according to the Acceptance Condition of indicative conditionals,
which Chalmers and Ha´jek extracted from Ramsey’s quotation, implicitly requires
the agent to not only accepts that p but also consciously reflects on her (hypotheti-
cal) acceptance of p. Admittedly, an agent may still decline to accept that she accepts
what she actually accepts out of bad faith or false consciousness (due to ideological
indoctrination), and certain beliefs/acceptances may be so cognitively entrenched
in our mindsets that they are irreversible by mere wish or assertion of rejection (in
this sense the case of implicit bias is still a good one: an agent may be self-deceived
to think that she accepts gender equality while deep down in her heart she is still
very much in the grip of self-sabotage based on her own gender.) However, setting
these problems aside, the Moorean principles do have their intuitive appeals. After
all, as [Chalmers & Ha´jek, 2003] point out, rejection of Moore’s principles in general
is “tantamount to accepting the Mooore-pardadoxical sentence ‘Not-p and I believe
p”’ which sounds categorically irrational. Moreover, I think it is worth pointing out
that after all, Moore’s principles are indicative conditionals and therefore an analysis
of the acceptability of Moore’s principle without a prior analysis of the acceptability
conditions for indicative conditionals is like a castle floating in the air.
4 It is also worth pointing out that Chalmers & Ha´jek themselves do not take their
formulation of the Acceptability Condition as the only or most faithful interpreta-
tion of the quotation from Ramsey. In their only footnote, they suggest that perhaps
the second sentence of the quotation could be read as “an indicative conditional ‘if
p then q’ is acceptable to S iff S’s conditional probability P(q|p) is high.” How-
ever, as [Leitgeb, 2011] points out and I intimated in my fleeting remarks about
the equivalence between the Accetpability Condition and Lowe’s counterfactual in-
terpretation of conditional probabilities, whether or not the conditional-probability-
interpretation of Ramsey’s quotation avoids the Ramsey+Moore=God problem de-
pends on how we define the value of a given conditional probability. In particular,
on Lowe’s account, the conditional probability of I accept that p given that p is x
just in case, if I were to have full credence in p, then my degree of credence in me
believing that p is x. But since I believe that p iff I have full credence in p, on Lowe’s
interpretation of conditional probability the “conditional-probability-interpretation”
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The entailment of omniscience and infallibility highlights the fact
that, despite its apparent plausibility, the Acceptability Condition
fails to capture two important qualifications in Ramsey’s original pro-
posal. Recall that according to AC, in order to determine whether or
not “if p then q” is acceptable S should
1. accept that p
2. adjudicate the acceptability of q
On the other hand, according to Ramsey, in deciding whether or not
one should accept the conditional, one should
1. add p hypothetically to her stock of knowledge
2. decide on that basis the acceptability of q.
The differences are minor but significant. While a full exposition of
their distinction requires quite a bit of technicality and terminology,
intuitively, the qualification of “hypothetically” and “on that basis”
are crucial because they capture two important facts about supposi-
tional reasoning: 1) it is possible to hypothetically accept p without
actually accepting that p, and 2) in order for the indicative condi-
tional “if p then q” to be acceptable, there should be some kind of
connection between p and q that holds independently of the particu-
lar truth-values of p and q. 5 Without these two qualifications, the
Acceptability Condition effectively renders it impossible for the sub-
ject 1) to perform a second-order evaluation of her actual epistemic
attitude towards p when assessing the acceptability of a conditional
with antecedent p, and 2) to reject an indicative conditional when she
actually believes that q whether or not p is true. In this regard, one
does not need to appeal to conditionals involving second-order epis-
temic evaluations in order to see the problem with the Acceptability
Condition. For example, consider the conditional
If I finish my thesis tonight, then it will rain tomorrow.
Suppose that, according to weather broadcast, it is likely to rain
tomorrow. Then according to the Acceptability Condition, in order
to adjudicate the acceptability of this conditional, one should i) ac-
cept that I finish my thesis tonight, and then ii) assess the likelihood
of it raining tomorrow, which according to our assumption about the
of Ramsey’s test turns out to be equivalent to the qualitative formulation of the
Acceptability Condition and therefore is vulnerable to the same problem.
5 Note that here we are talking about acceptability or assentability of “if p then q”,
which may be related to but should be distinguished from the truth-value of “if p
then q” (if it has any). I take it to be uncontroversial that even for faithful proponents
of material conditionals, the acceptability of an indicative conditional cannot be fully
determined by the truth-values of its individual components. For otherwise the
sentence “If I pray then God will listen” is acceptable just in case I do not pray,
which I think is counterintuitive.
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setup, is high. So the Acceptability Condition sanctions that the given
conditional is acceptable. Yet even if this conditional is in fact accept-
able, there seems to be something missing in the adjudication proce-
dure: we accept the conditional solely based on the high likelihood
of its consequent, which has nothing to do with the antecedent.
In his response to Chalmers & Ha´jek’s analysis of the Ramsey Test
for indicative conditionals, [Barnett, 2008] draws a distinctions be-
tween hypothetical acceptance (HA) and categorical acceptance (CA)
as follows:
(HA) S hypothetically accepts a proposition p just in case
S accepts p in virtue of hypothesizing it, supposing it, or
holding it on the basis of some hypothesis or supposition.
(CA) S categorically accepts a proposition p just in case S
accepts p independent of any hypothesis or supposition.
This distinction corresponds well to the widely acknowledged dis-
tinction between cognitive imagination and belief.6 And while it is
a well-known fact, it is worth emphasizing that a subject can hypo-
thetically accept that p without categorically accepting that p. For
example, sometimes in mathematical demonstration that p is true,
one (who is not an intuitionist) may hypothetically accept ¬p is true
for the sake of a contradiction. Barnett argues that this distinction be-
tween hypothetical and categorical extends to considerations as well:
(HC) S hypothetically considers that p just in case she consid-
ers p in virtue of hypothesizing it, supposing it, or holding
it on the basis of some hypothesis or supposition.
and
(CC) S categorically considers a proposition p just in case
S considers p independent of any hypothesis or supposi-
tion.
Having these two distinctions at hand, Barnett then makes the fol-
lowing observations: when a subject is asked to suppose that p and
then asked to evaluate the proposition “I accept that p”, the task as
presented is ambiguous because there are two sense of the word “ac-
ceptance” (i.e. HA or CA) and two ways in which she could be asked
to assess the proposition (i.e. HC or CC, or equivalently within or out-
side of the suppositional context). Depending on the specification of
6 The two distinctions are not necessarily equivalent because, as I briefly mentioned
in footnote 1 in my introduction, some may insist that supposition is different
from cognitive imagination and belief is different acceptance (Cf. [Maher, 1990],
[Arcangeli, 2014]). But I suppose here the main reason why Barnett introduces new
terminologies, rather than appealing to the existing notions of supposition vs. ac-
ceptance, is that he wants to motivate a much more subtle distinction between hy-
pothetical consideration and categorical consideration, which shall be introduced
shortly.
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the meaning of “acceptance” used and the evaluational context, the
requirements of rationality turn out to be different and are summa-
rized as follows:
“I accept that p” HA CA
CC CA indeterminate
HC 7 7
In short, the table does nothing more than reiterating the distinc-
tion between hypothetical and categorical acceptances: when the sub-
ject is merely hypothetically accepting p, her assumption about p only
affects her belief about her hypothetical epistemic stance towards p,
but not her belief regarding her real (i.e. categorical) epistemic stance
towards p. In short, when she supposes that p and is asked to con-
sider whether she actually supposes p, then her answer is yes; if she
is asked instead whether she believes p, then her answer is indeter-
minate.
On the other hand, if the agent is asked to assess whether she ac-
cepts p within her suppositional context (i.e. by hypothetically consid-
ering the proposition “I accept that p”), is she required by rationality
to accept, hypothetically or categorically, that she accepts that p? Bar-
nett says neither. For by supposing that p, the agent does not make
any extra hypothetical commitment to her own doxastic stance with
respect to p, i.e. she does not suppose in addition that “I suppose that
p” or “I believe that p” - all she supposes is that p. If we model the
agent’s cognitive enterprise in terms of boxes, then the foregoing anal-
ysis amounts to the observation that, upon hypothetically accepting
that p, the agent
1. does not make any change whatsoever with respect to her cate-
gorical epistemic stance towards p;
2. forms a box of hypothetical acceptance that includes p and all
her initial categorical acceptances prior to supposing that p
3. modifies her posterior categorical acceptances by adding the propo-
sition “I suppose that p” (or I hypothetically accept that p)
Thus, on this interpretation of the Ramsey Test, upon supposing
that p, the proposition “I accept that p” is acceptable if and only if it
is read as “(from a non-hypothetical standpoint) I suppose that p”. So
the only way for “if p then I accept that p” to turn out to be true is for
it to mean something like “If p, then (by virtue of evaluating a con-
ditional with antecedent p) I suppose that p.” Yet if we unpack the
conditional in this way, then it does not imply that the subject is om-
niscient. So the case is far less controversial if not trivially true. And
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analogous reasoning shows that the other conditional - “if I accept
that p, then p” - can be handled in similar fashion.
Where does this leave us? Recall that Lowe posits that the condi-
tional probability P(B|A) is defined as the probability that B would
have if P(A) were 1. I have argued that this definition of conditional
probability cannot account for cases in which B is inconsistent with
the subject having full belief in A, such as “I won’t believe that A given
that A.” However, if we modify the account into a suppositional ac-
count, then Barnett’s distinction between hypothetical acceptance and
categorical acceptance seems to give us enough theoretical resources
to handle the counterexamples levied against the counterfactual ac-
count of conditional probability. Specifically
Suppositional Account of Conditional Probability P(B|A) =
x iff supposing that A is true and on that basis, P(B) = x.
On the other hand, it also seems plausible that
‘If A then B’ is probable just in case supposing that A is
probable and on that basis, B is probable.
So if we unpack the meaning and implication of the suppositional ac-
count correctly, then the meaning of conditional probability coincides
with the meaning of indicative conditionals. Hence THE THESIS is
true, if not trivially so: the conditional probability of B given that A is
given by the probability of the corresponding conditional “if A then
B” because to measure the conditional probability P(B|A) just is to
evaluate the likelihood of “if A then B.”
However, traditionally supporters of the suppositional account of
indicative conditionals (and therefore THE THESIS) have been fac-
ing two formidable challenges: the triviality argument, and a host
of counterexamples whereby our credence in the conditional and our
conditional credence given the antecedent seem to come apart. I ar-
gue that 1) the triviality argument is a special case of THE THESIS-
violating sentence, and 2) both challenges can be met by properly
analyzing the content and procedure of supposition that one is asked
to perform when assessing the probability of indicative conditionals
or its corresponding conditional probability.7
7 Surely if we take conditional probability to be a technical term, a fixed numerical
value given by the Ratio formula or the extended integral analysis, then I agree with
the objector that the conditional probability and the probability of conditionals need
not coincide with each other. Yet if we take Ha´jek’s starting point of treating con-
ditional probability as a loaded notion, both semantically and metaphysically, then
the inequality results seem much less convincing than they originally do. In partic-
ular, as I foreshadowed in my introduction, if we interpret conditional probability
within the subjectivist framework and take it to mean something like the degree of
conditional credence, then there is nothing a priori that should prevent us from at
least entertaining the possibility that conditional probability, like its unconditional
counterpart, could be relativized with respect to the specific content of the condi-
tionalized event as well as the conditionalization procedure.

6
T W O O B J E C T I O N S T O T H E T H E S I S
6.1 the triviality objection
One of the most famous objections to THE THESIS is given by [Lewis, 1976]:
suppose that
P(A→ B) = P(B|A). (1)
In addition, assume that belief functions for rational agents are closed
under conditionalization, i.e. P(·|A) is a single-place probability func-
tion that also satisfies THE THESIS, namely
P(B→ C|A) = PA(B→ C) = PA(C|B) (2)
for any proposition B and C. Then observe that, for any proposition
A, B, C with P(A&B) 6= 0, we have





Lastly, by the total law of probability, for any proposition A, B with
P(B) 6= 0 and P(¬B) 6= 0, we have
P(A) = P(A|B)P(B) + P(A|¬B)P(¬B) (4)
Now let A, C be two propositions such that P(AC) and P(¬A¬C) are
both positive, then
P(A→ C) = P(A→ C|C)P(C) + P(A→ C|¬C)P(¬C)
= P(C|AC)P(C) + P(C|A¬C)P(¬C)
= 1 · P(C) + 0 · P(¬C)
= P(C) (5)
So (1)-(5) jointly imply that for any proposition A, C, P(C|A) = P(C),
i.e. A and C are probabilistically independent. Yet this surely seems
absurd. To use one of Lewis’ own examples, suppose a fair die is
thrown. Let A be the event that it lands on an even number and C
be the event that it lands on 6. Then P(AC) and P(¬A¬C) are both
nonzero. But P(C|A) = 1/2 6= P(C) = 1/6. In fact, Lewis observes
61
62 two objections to the thesis
that, if the foregoing analysis is correct, then the only probabilistic
model in which P(A → C) = P(C|A) is true is one with only four
possible numbers for probability assignments, i.e. for any proposition
A we have P(A) ∈ {0, a, 1− a, 1}. THE THESIS could be true, but
only trivially so in models that are too simple to represent the belief
system of a rational agent.
Since (1) is THE THESIS, (3) comes from (1) and (2), (4) is a general
law about probability and (5) is a direct derivation from (1)-(4), it
appears that the only way one can resist THE THESIS is by rejecting
(2). But (2) is in line with the general rule of Bayesian reasoning,
which states that the posterior probability of B, upon observing that
A, is given by
P′(B) = PA(B) = P(B|A).
So it would appear that the triviality proof has put a nail in the coffin
for THE THESIS. The only way out for those who desperately want
to preserve the truth of THE THESIS is by positing that indicative
conditionals are not propositions to begin with and hence are not
proper objects of subjective probability functions (functions of which
the domain is the Boolean algebra of propositions).1
However, I think Lewis’ triviality argument is not irresistible. But
before I expose its falsity, I shall present another objection to THE
THESIS which argues that there are “Ramsey-violating” condition-
als for which the degree of our posterior belief given the antecedent
does not correspond with our degree of belief in the conditionals,
i.e. P(A → C) 6= P(C|A). While this objection has often been dis-
cussed separately from the triviality results, following Kaufmann, I
argue that they are in fact two sides of the same coin in the sense that
both arguments point to the fact that there are two distinct and legit-
imate ways of computing conditional probabilities. However, unlike
Kaufmann, who thinks that the distinction between these two meth-
ods lies in their different ways of modelling the situation, I argue that
the two methods come apart not in terms of their different model-
theoretic parameters, but with respect to the way in which we make
our suppositions.
1 In fact (2) sounds very dubious when applied to conditionals given that it implies
the following unintuitive consequences:
P(B→ C|A) = P(A→ C|B) = P(C|AB) (1)
and as a result,
P(A→ C|A) = P(A→ C) (2)
P(A→ C|C) = 1 (3)
where 2 and 3 jointly imply the triviality result
P(A→ C) = P(C) (4)
Yet intuitively, the sentences “if B then C, given that A” is not necessarily equiproba-
ble as the sentence “if A then C given that B.”
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6.2 the hospital-objection
Suppose there are 72 patients in a hospital, 12 from town X and 60
from town Y. Among the 12 patients from X, 10 exhibit the symptom
S for a particular disease D and 9 of them actually have disease D. On
the other hand, there are only 10 patients from town Y who have the
symptom S and 1 who is diagnosed to have disease D. Suppose you
are about to check on Jo, and based on your information about Jo, you
are 75% sure that she is from Y rather than X. I invite the reader to
stop here and ponder the following question: what is the probability
that, if Jo exhibits the symptom S, then she has the disease D?





It appears that one can reason as follows:
1. It is likely that Jo is from community Y.
2. If Jo is from Y, then only 1 in 10 patients who bear the symptom
S actually has the disease D.
3. So it is unlikely that if Jo exhibits the symptom S, then she has
the disease D.
On this account, the probability that “if S then D” is low.
On the other hand, the conditional probability P(D|S) is given by





= P(D|SX)P(X|S) + P(D|SY)P(Y|S)
= 0.6
which is high. So our intuited probability of the conditional differs
from the conditional probability, which contradicts THE THESIS.2
[Kaufmann, 2004] observes that these two observations do not jus-
tify a distinction between probability of conditionals and conditional
probability. Rather, they reflect two ways in which we can reason
about a given conditional. He notes that the computation of condi-
tional probability as presented above can be presented qualitatively
as follows
1. Suppose that Jo has the symptom S.
2 The numerical structure of the example first appeared [Kaufmann, 2004]. Here I
used the version given in [Khoo, 2016].
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2. Since only 10 out of 60 people from town Y exhibits symptom
S, it is more likely that Jo is from town X.
3. Given that Jo is from town X, since 9 out of 10 people from town
X who have symptom S actually has the disease D, it follows
that it is likely that Jo has disease D.
On the other hand, the first observation can be formalized using
probability logic as follows:
P(S→ D) = P(S→ D|X)P(X) + P(S→ D|Y)P(Y)
= P(D|SX)P(X) + P(D|SY)P(Y)
= 0.3
Following Kaufmann, I shall call the method that yields low prob-
ability value in this particular case the “local probability” denoted as
Pl(S → D), and the other method the “global probability.” In gen-
eral, let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a partition of the population. Then the local












As demonstrated in The Hospital, the local and global probabilities
of a given conditional do not necessarily agree with each other in gen-
eral. But then we seem to end up in a paradoxical situation in which
two apparently sound arguments yield exactly opposite predictions
with respect to the likelihood of a single conditional. Which, if any, is
the correct probability of “if S, then D”?
[Douven, 2008] argues that the local probability method is inadmis-
sible because depending on the way in which a population is parti-
tioned, a subject may be asked to assign different local probabilities
to the same conditional (Douven, 259). For example, suppose that we
fine-grain our partitions of the patients based on their residency and
levels of income. So instead of having two groups X and Y, we have
four groups of patients X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 where X1 and Y1 are peo-
ple who live below the poverty line. The data for the new partition
scheme is given as follows:
X1 X2 Y1 Y2
S 6 4 3 7
D 6 3 1 0
total 6 6 10 50
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Now as before, you are 25% sure that Jo is from town X and 75%
sure that she is from town Y. But you have no direct information
about Jo’s income level. So your subjective probability in Jo being a
member of X1 (i.e. Jo is from X and lives below the poverty line) is
given by P(X1) = 1/2× 1/4 = 1/8. Similarly P(X2) = 1/8, P(Y1) =
1/8 and P(Y2) = 5/8. Now according to the rule of computing local
probabilities,
Pl(S→ D) = P(S→ D|X1)P(X1) + P(S→ D|X2)P(X2) + P(S→ D|Y1)P(Y1)
+ P(S→ D|Y2)P(Y2)
= P(S|DX1)P(X1) + P(S|DX2)P(X2) + P(S|DY1)P(Y1) + P(S|DY2)P(Y2)
= 1 · 1/8+ 3/4 · 1/8+ 1/3 · 1/8+ 0 · 5/8
= 25/96
≈ 0.26
So we may get different local probabilities merely by fine-graining
the partition of our sample population. While I have foreshadowed
that such partition-sensitivity might be plausible in the continuous
setting where we have ill-defined intuitions about microscopic events,
in the discrete case, it seems that partitions have much less bearing
on how we conceptualize a given event. Therefore, the way in which
we partition an event space in the discrete case should have little
if any influence on the probabilities of a given conditional and the
corresponding conditional probability.
Before I move on, it is worth pointing out that - as I have foreshad-
owed at the beginning of this section - given Kaufmann’s distinction
between local and global probabilities, Lewis’ triviality proof is noth-
ing but an extreme case of the local probability of “if A then C” where
the event space is coarsely partitioned into C and ¬C:
Pl(A→ C) = P(A→ C|C)P(C) + P(A→ C|¬C)P(¬C)
Against this background partition, the corresponding global probabil-
ity of “if A then C” is given by
Pg(A→ C) = P(C|AC)P(C|A) + P(C|A¬C)P(¬C|A)
= 1 · P(C|A) + 0 · P(¬C|A)
= P(C|A)
Since the value of local probability is context-dependent, it follows
that what Lewis has really shown is not that THE THESIS implies
triviality, but that if THE THESIS is true, then the local probability
of indicative conditionals against the background partition of {C,¬C}
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must be trivial. This is arguably much weaker if not trivially true on
its own right. 3
Now Douven contends that the rule of computing local probability
is inconsistent because it yields different values for the same probabil-
ity distribution under different partitions. This makes the local prob-
ability highly context-dependent. And Douven is pessimistic about
the prospects of a contextualized theory of Bayesian epistemology.
“To mention but one major hurdle for such a project: the possibil-
ity of contextually induced shifts in degrees of belief seems in direct
conflict with the key Bayesian principle that the only rational shifts
in one’s degrees of belief are those brought about via the rule of
conditionalization.” (Douven, 263) Provided that the “rule of condi-
tionalization” accords with the rule of computing global probabilities
rather than local probabilities, Douven argues that our first intuition
about The Hospital - the intuition that squares with the prediction of
local probability - must be explained away rather than explained. 4
In response, I think this objection is founded on the false assump-
tion that ideally, the probabilistic representations of our credence
should be partition-invariant. We have seen in the first chapter that,
in relatively complex cases (which are nevertheless realizable in phys-
ical experiments), such assumptions do not hold in general: the con-
ditional probabilities of certain microscopic events may be heavily de-
pendent on the way in which we parametrize our event space. And
I shall demonstrate that the same is true in discrete cases by con-
sidering another paradox that is surprisingly rarely discussed in the
literature of probabilities: Simpson’s Paradox.5
3 Douven made a similar point in footnote 5 of [Douven, 2006]. He verifies that
“the method of calculating the probabilities of conditionals that respects THE THE-








P(C|AX′i )P(X′i |A) for partitions {X1, . . . , Xn} and {X′1, . . . , X′m}. To this extent,
another way to look at Lewis’ triviality argument is that it is not so much an objection
to that THE THESIS is false as a demonstration that the order of conditionalization
affects the probability one would get. Lewis was onto something, but failed to push
all the way through.
4 Note that Douven’s argument is consistent with THE THESIS and to this extent he
is very much an ally on my side. However, I disagree with Douven that the Ramsey-
violating examples should be explained away by means of an error theory. While
it is a well-known fact that people are generally bad at probabilistic reasoning, and
sometimes their mistakes are systematic and predictable (e.g.conjunction fallacy), I
think in this particular case the ambiguity is intrinsic to the notion of conditional
probability. In particular, to my knowledge there has been no probability theory
that gives well-defined method for computing embedded conditional probability:
the probability of “C given that B” given that A. So unlike the conjunction fallacy,
where we start off with one well-defined correct answer, in the case of condition-
als we have no uncontroversial standard by which we can adjudicate the relative
rationality/irrationality of human reasoning.
5 Kaufmann’s response to Douven is slightly different: he appeals to a distinction be-
tween model and scenario. A scenario is a linguistic description of a particular physical
setup and therefore could be under-determined, whereas a model is always well-
6.3 conditional probability and simpson’s paradox 67
6.3 conditional probability and simpson’s paradox
Suppose that a college is hiring junior faculty members for two de-
partments: Mathematics and Philosophy. Each department has 13
job applicants. For Philosophy, there are 5 male candidates, among
whom 1 is hired, and 8 female candidates, among whom 2 are hired.
On the Mathematics side, there are 8 male candidates, among whom
6 are hired, and 5 female candidates, among whom 4 are hired. The












Note that when we restrict ourselves to the employment data of
each individual department, it seems that the hiring policy favors







when we aggregate the data together, we realize that the inequality is
reversed: 7 out of 13 male candidates are hired, whereas 6 out of 13
female candidates are hired.7
Now instead of looking at the relative unconditional probability of
being hired for male and female candidates, we can instead look at
defined. The same event can receive two incompatible probability assignments in
two different scenarios. This distinction makes sense relative to Kaufmann’s central
thesis, which is that different scenarios represent different assumptions about causal
in/dependencies. I shall illustrate Kaufmann’s idea in The Hospital: if the agent sup-
poses that the residency of a patient is causally independent of her residency, then
when evaluating the conditional “if Jo has symptom S, then she has disease D”, the
agent would fix her prior credence about Jo’s residency unchanged on the basis of
supposing that she has symptom S. On the other hand, if she supposes that there is a
causal relation (or stochastic dependence, to be more precise) between Jo’s residency
and her bearing the symptom S, then upon supposing that S, the agent would sub-
sequently update her degree of belief in X to be P(X|S), and hence her consequent
degree of belief in the conditional “if S then D” would be informed by the global
probability rather than local probability.
I think this analysis has its merit but cannot accommodate all scenarios. Instead,
I argue that the suppositional account provides a simpler explanation for the phe-
nomenon at stake: an agent’s probability of conditional is given by her local or global
conditional probability depending on the order in which she makes her supposition:
if she holds her prior belief about the relative probabilities of a partition variable
fixed and then evaluating her conditional probability with respect to this fixed back-
ground belief, then her probability in the conditional is given by the local probability
or the conditional-conditional probability (conditional probability that is itself con-
ditionalized on an extraneous background distribution). If the agent supposes the
antecedent and subsequently adjusts all her degree of credence in her prior (partial)
acceptances on the basis of her supposition, then her conditional credence in the
consequent is given by her global probability.
6 This example is adapted from [Malinas and Bigelow, 2016].
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their relative conditional probabilities by recharacterizing the situa-
tion as follows:
suppose your job is to evaluate whether or not there is discrimina-
tion against female job candidates in the college hiring process. You
come across the file of a job candidate, whose name is Jo. You know
that Jo is applying for a job in either Philosophy or Mathematics, but
you don’t know which. In addition, you are not given any informa-
tion about Jo’s gender. Then you may ask yourself: what is the prob-
ability that, if Jo is male, then he is hired? According to Kaufmann,
the local probability is given by
Pl(M→ H) = P(M→ H|Phil)P(Phil) + P(M→ H|Math)P(Math)





On the other hand, the global conditional probability is given by








So the paradoxical relationship between the relative probabilities
of being hired as a male or female candidate is reaffirmed by the
local-global conditional probability. This is hardly surprising, given
that what gives rise to the Simpson’s Paradox in the first place is the
skewed population distributions across the partitions: despite the fact
that there are equal numbers of male and female candidates, there are
far more women applying to Philosophy that has a much lower hir-
ing rate. As a result, if we hold fixed our prior credence in whether
the candidate is applying for a job in Philosophy or Mathematics,
then we are effectively oblivious to the structural feature that is re-
sponsible for the Simpson’s Paradox. Hence we arrive at a similar
conclusion as we would have should we looked at only the data from
each sub-population. Once we take into account that the a male candi-
date is more likely to be applying for jobs in Mathematics, whereas a
female candidate is more likely to be applying for jobs in Philosophy,
then our conditional probability accords with our “global” observa-








8 This is not to suggest, however, that one ought to favor global probabilities over local
probabilities or vice versa. It is still an open question as to what data distribution that
fits the Simpson-characteristics ought to be interpreted to make conclusion about
causation or correlation. Similarly, I think both local and global probabilities are
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In fact, it is not hard to show that there is a tight relationship be-
tween the Simpson’s Paradox and the discrepancy between local and
global probabilities.9






























Assume that P(X|M) = bb+d and P(X|F) = BB+D .10 Then
Pl(Male→ Hired) < Pl(Female→ Hired)
but
Pg(Male→ Hired) > Pg(Female→ Hired).
Proof. The arithmetic is exactly isomorphic to the particular situation.
Pl(M→ H) = P(M→ H|X)P(X) + P(M→ H|Y)P(Y)















= Pl(F → H)
whereas

















= Pg(F → H)
salient ways of computing the unconditional probability of a conditional. I shall
address this point more in the following section.
9 I am using the hiring model for the sake of clarity and brevity, but it is clear that this
result holds for any scenarios).
10 See Appendix for a general case in which P(X) = P(Y) = 12
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I have shown that there seems to exist some degree of structural
similarity between Simpson’s paradox and the local-global distinc-
tion in conditional probabilities. As Kaufmann points out in his reply
to Douven, global probability is after all a special case of local proba-
bility with respect to a trivial partition of the entire event space. Thus,
insofar as there is no compelling argument to analyze the data by ag-
gregation or subdivision, I argue that neither is there an overriding
reason to favor global probability to local probability or vice versa.
The property of being partition-dependent is something deeply intrin-
sic to the notion of conditional probability that we have to embrace
rather than dismiss.
Part IV
A P P E N D I X
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6.4 probability primer
6.4.1 Kolmogorov’s axiomatization (unconditional probability-first)
A probability space is (Ω,F , P), where Ω is the sample space, F is
the event space, and P : F → [0, 1] is a function that satisfies the
following properties
1. P(E) ≥ 0, ∀E ∈ F .
2. P(Ω) = 1.
3. let E1, . . . , En be mutually exclusive events, then





6.4.2 Popper’s axiomatization (conditional probability-first)
A probability space is (Ω,F , P) where Ω is the sample space, F is
the event space, and P(·|·) : F ×F → [0, 1] is a function that satisfies
the following properties:
1. ∀A, B ∈ F , P(A|B) ≥ 0
2. ∀A ∈ F , P(A|A) = 1.
3. If there exists a C ∈ F such that P(C|B) 6= 1, then P(A|B) +
P(¬A|B) = 1.
4. ∀A, B, C ∈ F , P(A ∩ B|C) = P(A|B ∩ C)P(B|A)
5. ∀A, B, C ∈ F , P(A ∩ B|C) = P(B ∩ A|C)
6. ∀A, B, C ∈ F , P(A|B ∩ C) = P(A|C ∩ B)
7. There exist A, B ∈ F such that P(A|B) 6= 1.
6.5 the epistemological interpretation of the superve-
nience thesis
According to the epistemological interpretation of the Supervenience
Thesis, the possession of unconditional credence in AB and A is nec-
essary and sufficient for the formation of conditional credence in B
given that A. For instance, an agent has a conditional credence in
“it will be raining given that it is cloudy” just in case she has well-
defined unconditional credence in proposition “it will be raining and
it is cloudy” and “it is cloudy.”
One of the main objectors to this version of ST is Price. In [Price, 1986],
Price argues that unconditional credence in A and A&B are neither
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necessary nor sufficient for the possession of conditional credence in
B given that A. It is unnecessary because more than often we seem
capable of adjudicating our degree of belief in B on the condition that
A without having any opinion whatsoever regarding A or A&B. For
example, I believe that, on the condition that it is cloudy tonight, my
astronomy laboratory will be cancelled, while making no judgment
on whether it is in fact going to be cloudy tonight. In this case, I have
well-defined conditional credence in lab being cancelled given that it
is cloudy, which is 1, but the ratio between my absolute credence in
“it is cloudy and the lab is cancelled” and “it is cloudy” is undefined,
because my credence in it being cloudy tonight is indeterminate.11 So
“the possession of absolute credence is not a necessary condition for
the possession of conditional credence”.12
Price also argued that the possession of unconditional credence is
not a sufficient condition for the possession of conditional credence
either. For example, I believe 1 = 1 and the Earth orbits around the
Sun are both true. So my subjective probabilities for both proposi-
tions are well-defined and have the value of 1. And yet it does not
follow that I thereby have full credence that “the Earth orbits around
the Sun given that 1 = 1.” Note that it is not Price’s contention that
my conditional credence does not equal to 1 - in fact, he may very
well concede that if I were ever to acquire a conditional opinion re-
garding the “the Earth orbits around the Sun given that 1 = 1,” then
the value of my conditional credence would or at least should agree
with THE RATIO. Rather, his point is that the agent does not have to
adopt any conditional belief regarding the composite sentence “the
Earth orbits around the Sun given that 1 = 1” in the first place. So
we have a case in which the agent’s absolute credence in A and A&B
11 Some may object to this analysis by arguing that if I suspend my judgment on
whether it is cloudy or not, then my subjective probability in “it is cloudy tonight”
is not undefined but 0.5. I think Price can respond to this objection by making
a distinction between “suspension of judgment” and “absence of judgment”. It is
plausible that after balancing the possibility of it being cloudy or not cloudy tonight,
I find myself unable to give assent to either proposition. Yet this is not the situation
that I am in when I assent to the conditional belief that the lab will be cancelled
given that it is cloudy. Rather, the thought of whether it is cloudy or not simply has
not crossed my mind at all.
12 Ha´jek made a similar point when defending his analysis of coin-tossing. Ac-
cording to Ha´jek, the conditional probability of the coin lands on head,
given that I (i.e. Ha´jek) toss it fairly, is 1/2, and yet the ratio of
P(the coin lands on head and I toss it fairly) to P(I toss it fairly) (where P stands for
the subjective probability function of the reader) is undefined because the reader
knows nothing about Ha´jek’s proclivity to throw the coin fairly. In response to the
objection that a rational subject must assign some number to P(I toss it fairly) and
P(the coin lands on head and I toss it fairly), Ha´jek pointed out that “you didn’t as-
sign any value to ‘Toss’, did you? But even if you did, for some reason, why must
you assign a value to ‘Toss’? No one is coercing you to make bets on ‘Toss’, or to
form corresponding preferences; no one is coercing you to make the relevant judg-
ments; no one is coercing you to form the relevant dispositions. And if someone
did coerce you, we would get an answer alright, but it is doubtful if it would reveal
anything about your state of mind prior to the coercion.” (Ha´jek, 297)
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are well-defined and yet her conditional credence in B given that A
is not, which seems to suggest that the possession of the former is
insufficient for the possession of the latter. Hence the Ratio is inade-
quate.13
However, I think Price’s argument would not work for Ha´jek for
three reasons. First, Price’s objection is predicated on the assumption
that conditional credence is the assent condition for indicative con-
ditionals. This assumption is crucial because it allows Price to infer
the reader’s epistemic stance with respect to P(B|A) from her doxas-
tic attitude towards the conditional “if A, then B”: since conditional
credence is necessary and sufficient for assent to conditionals, then
conversely a lack of assent to conditionals would indicate an absence
of conditional credence and vice versa. To this extent Price’s objec-
tion to the Ratio is at best pro tanto: it holds only if the sentences
“B, given that A” and “if A then B” are semantically equivalent or
at least intimately connected in terms of their expressive contents. In
other words, if what the Ratio prescribes seems to contradict our daily
experiences with conditional judgments, then it is plausible that the
true culprit is not the Ratio but the assumption that one possesses a
conditional credence in B given that A if and only if one possesses an
unconditional credence in “if A then B”. Thus what Price has shown
is not that the Ratio is a false analysis of conditional credence, but
that the adequacy of the Ratio as an analysis of conditional credence
is inconsistent with THE THESIS that conditional credence represents
the assentability of the corresponding conditional. Admittedly, this is
not so much of a problem for Price, for the ultimate goal of his project
is to vindicate THE THESIS as an analytic truth. Yet this would be a
serious problem for Ha´jek, a devoted opponent to Adams’ Thesis, if
Price’s objection is (partially) what he has in mind.
Secondly, Price argues that the possession of unconditional cre-
dence in A and B is insufficient for having conditional credence in
P(B|A). Yet the fact that one does not adopt a conditional credence
in X does not imply that one should not adopt a conditional credence
in X. Given that subjectivism is an idealized model of human epis-
temology that is built upon the (rather unrealistic) presupposition
that our degrees of beliefs can be as fine-grained as all real numbers
between 0 and 1, the Ratio seems to serve a rather normative role
by prescribing how much credence a rational epistemic agent should
have, as opposed to describing how much credence a normal human
agents actually possesses. While Price may bite the bullet and argue
13 It is easy to object to Price’s objection by accusing him of an unfaithful reading
of the Ratio: the Ratio specifies what is or constitutes conditional credence, not a
necessary and sufficient condition for possessing conditional credence. I think Price
can respond to this objection by appealing to the Leibniz’s law, or pointing out the
apparent fact that Y is X only if one possesses X if and only if one possesses Y. So
the fact that the ratio and conditional credence can be out of sync with respect to
their mental possession by an agent is itself a piece of convincing evidence that they
are not in fact identical with each other.
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that even the idealized agent does not and should not adopt such a
conditional credence just in virtue of possessing two well-defined un-
conditional credence, I think he cannot defend this line of argument
without again appealing to the semantic equivalence between condi-
tional credence and credence in conditionals. It may be true that we
cannot and should not draw the conclusion “if 1 = 1 then the Earth
orbits around the Sun”, even if we know that both the antecedent and
the consequent are in fact true; yet it is less clear whether we should
or should not infer “the Earth orbits around the Sun, on the condition
that 1 = 1” from the truths of each composite element of the sentence.
Again, as I mentioned in the end of previous paragraph, this is not so
much of a problem for Price given that he subscribes to THE THESIS,
but this path is not open to Ha´jek in light of his rejection of equating
conditional credence with credence in conditionals.
Thirdly, Price argues that we can have well-formed conditional cre-
dence without adopting any doxastic attitude towards its antecedent
or consequent (assuming the truth of THE THESIS), and this shows
that the Ratio is inadequate. Here I agree with Edgington that this is
“an over-reaction”. This reading of THE RATIO mistakes mathemat-
ical exposition as a description or prescription of the right order of
human thinking - something that mathematical representation does
not even aspire to achieve. In fact, the Ratio was first conceived of as:
P(A&B) = P(B|A)P(A),
in which case conditional probability is taken to be primitive and
works in conjunction with the unconditional probability of A to de-
rive the joint probability of A and B. To this extent, it seems that
the subject of the Ratio is not P(B|A) per se but the equality between
P(B|A) and P(A) as well as P(A&B). It describes a relationship
that should hold in between conditional and unconditional credence
without making any loaded assumption about which one has epis-
temic primacy (Edgington cited Russell’s example that the fact that
P ∧ Q ≡ ¬(¬P ∨ ¬Q) does not imply that one is epistemically prior
to the other, or that one must be able to believe one in order to ac-
quire a full credence in the other). “Conditional degree of belief is
an interesting concept to the extent that the ratios are stable fixture
of a belief system, which can be settled independently of P(A) and
P(A&B).” (Edgington, 267)
To recaptiulate: I have shown that Price’s objection to the episte-
mological interpretation of ST is premised on the truth of THE THE-
SIS that the conditional credence in B given that A determines the
assentability of the conditional “if A then B”, together with a false
understanding of the function and purpose of mathematical exposi-
tion. Note that Ha´jek explicitly rejects THE THESIS, which is why I
take him to be arguing against a non-epistemological interpretation
of ST.
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6.6 a slight generalization of simpson’s paradox and
local probabilities
Theorem For Theorem 1, suppose instead that P(X) = p and P(Y) =
1 − p and b + B = d + D. Let x1 = ab , x2 = cd , y1 = AB and y2 =
C
D . Assume that xi − yj = xm − yn for all i, j, m, n ∈ {1, 2}.14. Then
Pg(M→ H) > Pg(F → H) iff
Dd
(b + d)(B + D)
< p <
bD + d(B + D)
(b + d)(B + D)
6.7 multiplicative axiom and local probability
Corollary 1. The multiplicative axiom for conditional probability (MA)
(P(A|C) = P(A|B)P(B|C) whenever AC entails B and B entails C) is
incompatible with the rule for computing local probabilities.






Then all patients who exhibit the symptom and actually have the
disease are from twon X. And all patients from town X exhibits the
symptom S. So S and D entail X and X entails S. Now according to
MA, the conditional probability of P(D|S) is given by









On the other hand,




14 This is hardly a relaxed assumption, since it is not even satisfied by the original ex-
ample. However a more general case would be much less computationally tractable,
and I deem this condition is relaxed enough to give the reader a sense of what are
the determining factors for the value of p
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